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INTRODUCTION
Not every witness with relevant information is willing to testify.
When a witness is recalcitrant, the state has at its disposal a bevy of
carrots and sticks designed to elicit or encourage cooperation.' Al-
though some recalcitrant witnesses require only moderate pressure
from the court, others refuse to cooperate even when faced with a
court order backed by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions.
Nonetheless, a witness who absolutely refuses to cooperate with the
judicial process-in other words, who attempts to win at the game of
"Prisoner's Dilemma"2-may still play an important role in a judicial
proceeding. Sometimes prosecutors may use the very fact that a wit-
ness chooses not to testify to advance their case against a criminal de-
fendant, introducing that choice as an evidentiary fact at trial.' This
is a particularly effective strategy when the witness and the defendant
are both members of the same criminal conspiracy or organization.
In recent years, the strategy of highlighting the non-cooperation of
certain witnesses has been actively employed in the fight against or-
ganized crime.4 Not surprisingly, defendants have complained that
1. The government's carrots include the ability to arrange plea bargains in exchange for
cooperation, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, and the power to confer statutory use immunity. See 18
U.S.C. § 6002 (1994); see also Edward R. Korman, The Use of Testimony Compelled Under a Grant of
Use Immunity, 44 BROOK. L. REV. 935, 935 (1978). For a good overview of the history of use
immunity statutes, see David Sugar, Note, Federal Witness Immunity Problems and Pratices Under 18
U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 275, 275-82 (1976). Prosecutors also have the ability
to distribute a wide assortment of other benefits, such as inclusion in the witness protection
program, see 18 U.S.C. § 3521, or cash payments, see United States v. Castleberry, 642 F.2d 1151,
1153 (1981) (demonstrating that under law, government paid witness money to move, pay his
bills, and provided $700 per month until trial).
These positive incentives are complemented by many powerful sticks, including the power to
prosecute non-cooperative witnesses for obstruction of justice, misprision of felony and crimi-
nal contempt of court, not to mention the basic discretionary authority to bring substantive
criminal charges against individuals for related counts or for unrelated activities. See HARRY I.
SUBIN ET AL., FEDERALCRIMINAL PRACTICE § 12.8-12.9 (West 1992) (discussing prosecutor's op-
tions for dealing with reluctant witnesses).
2. See STEVEN M. CRAFTON & MARGARET F. BRINIG, QUANTITATIVE METHODS FOR LAWYERS
173 (1994) (describing "prisoner's dilemma" as a heuristic device invented by game theorists to
demonstrate rational and irrational cooperation strategies). In the traditional formulation of
the game, two conspirators in an armed robbery are held by the police and kept in separate
rooms for interrogation. Each of the prisoners is told that he will receive a short prison sen-
tence if he pleads guilty and testifies against his co-conspirator. If he refuses to cooperate, and
his coconspirator testifies against him, he will get a long prison sentence. If both conspirators
plead guilty, both will get medium sentences. If neither agrees to testify, prosecutors will be
unable to gather enough evidence to convict either suspect, and both will go free. See id. at
171. For a good discussion of the strategic complexities of Prisoner's Dilemma, see ROBERT M.
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
3. See generally infra Part II (discussing uses of such evidence at trial).
4. See infra notes 42-54 and accompanying text (detailing use of refusal to testifevidence
at trial for murder of Columbo and Gambino Crime Family members).
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this trial tactic biases juries against them and violates their constitu-
tional rights. Weighing the competing interests at issue is a task that
has perplexed many judges.5
The strategy of purposefully calling non-cooperative witnesses is ef-
fective primarily in two situations. First, prosecutors may use it in
multiple defendant trials, where a defendant pleads guilty, or is tried
and convicted, and subsequently is called to testify against a remain-
ing codefendant.6 Second, the strategy is useful in prosecuting or-
ganized crime when a member of the same crime family or organiza-
5. Acknowledging a split among the circuits, two Supreme CourtJustices have expressed
a desire to consider the question of whether the tactic is permissible when a witness can claim a
legitimate Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and the government knows
that the witness plans to invoke that privilege. See Lindsey v. United States, 484 U.S. 934, 934
(1987) (White,J, and Brennan,J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
6. See United States v. Cioffi, 242 F.2d 473, 477 (2d Cir. 1957) (holding that it was not
improper for the government to call a witness who had already pled guilty to the indictment, as
there was no expectation that witness would invoke the self-incrimination privilege). The Sec-
ond Circuit has approved the prosecution's elicitation of a refusal to testify in such a situation.
In United States v. Gernie, 252 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1958), the government called Benjamin Harell
to the witness stand, an individual who had been observed with one of the defendants and was
arrested while in possession of 2.5 ounces of heroin. He had pled guilty to charges of narcotics
possession and conspiracy, and was sentenced to five years imprisonment. See id. at 669. On
the stand, Harell admitted possessing the heroin, but when asked to name his source, he in-
voked the Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to answer. See id. Although the trial judge
sustained the witness's invocation of the privilege, the appeals court found that, because the
witness had previously pled guilty to charges of narcotics possession and conspiracy, he had no
rightful claim to the privilege and could be compelled to testify. See id. According to the Sec-
ond Circuit, "[tihe government had a right to call Harell to testify," even though the govern-
ment was probably aware that Harell would take the Fifth. See id. As the court observed,
"[u]nder such circumstances it makes no difference whether the government has reason to
believe that the witness will refuse to testify. It has a right to produce the witness and thus show
the jury that it is bringing forward such witnesses as may have knowledge bearing on the case."
Id. (citing United States v. Romero, 249 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1957); Cioffi, 242 F.2d at 477).
The court thus found no error in the trial court's decision to allow the witness to invoke
(unlawfully) his Fifth Amendment privilege before the jury, noting that the trial judge had is-
sued a limiting instruction to the jury "that this refusal was not to be taken as evidence against
the defendants." Id.
Similarly, in Cioffi, the government indicted three men on narcotics charges, two of whom
pled guilty. See Cioffi, 242 F.2d at 474. One of those who pled guilty was subsequently called to
testify, and refused to answer questions. See id. at 476. Again, the court found no error in call-
ing the witness, for "[ilnasmuch as [the witness] had already pleaded guilty to the indictment
he had no obvious reason for invoking the privilege against self-incrimination, and there is no
showing that the United States Attorney expected him to invoke the privilege on the stand." Id.
at 477 (citing United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822, 831-32 (2d Cir. 1950));see, e.g., United States
v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 978 (7th Cir.) (allowing immunized co-conspirator's refusal to testify to
occur before jury), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 250 (1996); United States v. Castleberry, 642 F.2d
1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 1981) (permitting witness's participation in witness protection program to
be brought to jury's attention); United States v. Spero, 625 F.2d 779, 780-81 (8th Cir. 1980)
(noting that government's case rested largely on testimony of a witness who cooperated in re-
turn for inclusion in witness protection program, immunity from prosecution, and large sum of
money); United States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1980) (calling former associate
of defendant to testify after associate was admitted into witness protection program); Romero,
249 F.2d at 375 (finding no error in government's calling of previously convicted and sen-
tenced defendants to testify in prosecution regarding same transaction, even where govern-
ment had reason to believe one would refuse to testify).
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:105
tion is not an appropriate target for independent prosecution (for
example, he or she may already be serving a prison sentence), but
may possess information regarding the activities of fellow mobsters
standing trial.7 Under the federal use immunity statute, prosecutors
may grant immunity to such a witness and then compel the witness to
testify.8 A witness who continues to refuse to testify after having been
immunized may be held in contempt of court and is subject to civil
and criminal penalties.9
This Article argues that the state's interests in presenting relevant
information to the jury and the compelling need to diminish the in-
fluence of organized crime generally justify allowing the jury to ob-
serve this process. Demonstrating to a jury the unresponsiveness of
selected witnesses may be necessary to establish certain important
evidentiary facts, and might also provide a foundation for relevant in-
ferences that the government may argue legitimately.0 Because this
tactic raises a wide array of constitutional and evidentiary concerns,
7. See United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 363 (2d Cir. 1995) (involving prosecution
of Gambino crime boss), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1671 (1996); United States v. Versaglio, 85 F.3d
943, 944 (2d Cir. 1996) (trial of Gambino Crime Family members).
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1994). The Use Immunity Statute provides federal prosecutors
with the discretionary power to grant a witness immunity against the use of any evidence pro-
vided by or resulting from testimony. See id. Immunity protects witnesses from prosecution in
future state as well as federal proceedings. See Rowe v. Griffin, 497 F. Supp. 610, 613-14 (D. Ala.
1980) (noting that doctrine of reciprocal immunity protects witness given immunity in state
prosecutions from Federal prosecutions and vice versa), affd, 676 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1982).
Use immunity differs from transactional immunity in that a defendant granted transactional
immunity can never be prosecuted for the events about which he or she testifies, whereas a de-
fendant testifying under use immunity remains eligible for prosecution as long as the evidence
is gathered from separate sources. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). The
scope of immunity under the use immunity statute is coterminous with the scope of the Fifth
Amendment privilege. See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 127 (1980) (finding that
Use Immunity Statute does not deprive a witness of Fifth Amendment privilege). An immu-
nized witness, therefore, has no legal basis for refusing to testify. See Reina v. United States, 364
U.S. 507, 514 (1960). When challenged, the use immunity provisions in the Federal Code con-
sistently have been upheld on the grounds that their long and extensive use has become part of
the constitutional fabric. See In re Martin-Trigona, 732 F.2d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding
constitutional the use of immunity provisions in all civil proceedings, including bankruptcy
proceedings); In reAndretla, 530 F.2d 681, 684 (6th Cir. 1976) (affirming the constitutionality
of applying immunity provisions to prospective grand jury witnesses); In re Food Prods. Investi-
gation, 462 F.2d 594, 595 (9th Cir. 1972) (upholding constitutionality of federal immunity pro-
visions).
9. An uncooperative immunized witness may be held in civil contempt under the federal
recalcitrant witness statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1994) (giving a court the authority summarily to
confine an uncooperative witness until the witness agrees to testify, or until the witness's refusal
to testify becomes moot or it reaches 18 months), or may face criminal contempt under the
criminal contempt provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 401. Ajudge also retains the power to hold per-
sons within his or her courtroom in summary criminal contempt. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 42; Ortiz,
84 F.3d at 979 (explaining difference between criminal contempt and summary civil con-
tempt).
10. See Gambino, 59 F.3d at 363 (stressing importance of co-conspirator testimony).
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however, trial courts must carefully monitor its use and limit it to a
particular set of circumstances.
Additionally, permissible evidentiary use of the refusal to testify
must be carefully constrained by well-tailored jury instructions."
These instructions must respond to the specific context in which the
elicited act of non-cooperation occurs. Such instructions should em-
phasize to the jury the acceptable range of inferences-if any-
appropriate to the evidence. Likewise, when the state seeks to capi-
talize on a witness's unwillingness to testify in order to buttress a
clearly speculative theory of the defendant's culpability, such inferen-
tial arguments should be prohibited by the court. Monitoring the
use of this tactic invariably requires judges to exercise broad discre-
tion over issues of relevance, prejudice, and general trial fairness, but
this is a role that judges are wholly accustomed to playing.
Although prosecutors may seek to demonstrate witness non-
cooperation in a wide variety of contexts, this Article does not at-
tempt to explore the evidentiary uses of non-cooperative behavior on
the part of a defendant's spouse, 2 lawyer, 3 or family members in
ordinary criminal trials. Such persons are often called during the
course of a trial to testify and occasionally refuse to do so even in the
face of a court order. The heavy sanctions available to judges to en-
force such orders, however, assure that except in unusual circum-
stances the witness will eventually cooperate. Additionally, ordinary
individuals' reasons for refusing to testify are likely to be so varied
and context-specific that any generalized evidentiary rules regarding
their conduct inevitably will fail.
Organized crime prosecutions, however, provide a unique set of
circumstances in which the tactic of allowing a witness to refuse to
testify before ajury may be both relevant and fair. When a witness is
a participant in a criminal conspiracy and is suspected of having
knowledge about the identity or action of other conspirators, the
11. See Part V.B (discussing role ofjury instructions with refusal to testify evidence).
12. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 755 F.2d 1022, 1025 (2d Cir. 1985) (invoking spousal
privilege and refusing to answer grand jury questions regarding husband's alleged participation
in conspiracy), vacated, 475 U.S. 133 (1986); United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 681 (7th Cir.
1984) (holding husband in contempt for refusing to take stand against wife and allowing
prosecution to comment on refusal).
13. See generally Deborah Stavile Bartel, Drawing Negative Inferences Upon a Claim of Attorney-
Client Pivilige 60 BROOK. L. REv. 1355 (1994) (criticizing comments to jury on lawyer's invoca-
tion of attorney-client privilege).
14. See, e.g., In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11, 16 (2d Cir. 1993) (refusing to recognize parent-child
privilege and compelling witness to testify against adult child); Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 428-
30 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding Constitution does not preclude compelled incrimination of
child); In re Matthews, 714 F.2d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that, other than spousal privi-
lege, there is no privilege that traditionally permits witnesses not to testify against in-laws).
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common law has long recognized that the state has a special interest
in, and perhaps a special claim on, such testimony.'5 (Indeed, a 1641
English statutory provision banning the use of torture to elicit con-
fessions expressly contained an exemption when a defendant was
fully tried, and suspected of possessing information regarding other
criminal conspirators.) This is in part because the structure of organ-
ized crime raises special problems for prosecutors seeking convic-
tions of high-ranking members of the criminal organization. To get
them, prosecutors typically are forced to rely very heavily on the tes-
timony of insiders, cooperators, and accomplices.' 6 As one commen-
tator pointed out,
One characteristic of organized crime is that the most culpable and
dangerous individuals rarely do the dirty work. Although the or-
ganization's leaders are ultimately responsible for its crimes, they
15.
No man shall be forced by Torture to confess any Crime against himself nor any other
unless it be in some Capital case, where he is first fully convicted by clear and sufficient
evidence to be guilty, After which if the cause be of that nature, That it is very appar-
ent there be other conspirators, or confederates with him, Then he may be tortured, yet
not with such Tortures as be Barbarous and inhumane.
The Body of Liberties, art. 45 (1641), reprinted in 7 OLD SOUTH LEAFLETS 265 (1905) (emphasis
added), quoted in Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1086, 1101 (1994).
Generally, witnesses have little legal standing to withhold testimony; the obligation to testify
has long been recognized in the Anglo-American system. See Piemonte v. United States, 367
U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961) (holding defendant's refusal to testify out of fear lacked any merit and
affirming "[e ]very citizen of course owes to his society the duty of giving testimony to aid in the
enforcement of the law"); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 439 n.15 (1956) ("[I]t is
every man's duty to give testimony... unless he invokes some valid legal exemption in with-
holding it."); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 481 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Ullmann and Piemont, and
finding witness had no basis for withholding testimony once convicted). A common trope
holds that "'when the course of justice requires the investigation of truth, no man has any
knowledge that is rightly private.'" In re Grand Jury Proceedings of John Doe, 842 F.2d 244,
246 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 2192, at 72 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). Transgression of the duty to report information re-
garding criminal activity has long been characterized as Misprision of Felony and codified at 18
U.S.C. § 4, which provides that:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a
court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the
same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United
States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or
both.
18 U.S.C. § 4 (1994); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) ("To ensure that
justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available
for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense."); Bran-
zburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (recognizing that the public has a right to the evi-
dence of all people, unless it is protected by a privilege); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S.
421, 438 (1932) (indicating that unless evidence is protected by privilege, it should be pro-
duced in court).
16. SeeJohn C.Jeffries,Jr. &John Gleeson, The Fetderalization of Organized Crime: Advantages
of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 1095, 1104 (1995) (noting that prosecution witnesses of-
ten are not law-abiding citizens themselves).
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typically deal through intermediaries and limit their own participa-
tion to behind-the-scenes control and guidance .... Generally
speaking, successful prosecution of organized crime leaders re-
quires the use of accomplice testimony.
But accomplice testimony in this context is extremely difficult to
secure. The technique of using the very recalcitrance of coconspira-
tors to incriminate one another as an evidentiary fact provides one
way to combat this difficulty. Such an approach to witness non-
cooperation is not inconsistent with current features of conspiracy
law. As this Article argues, the law of evidence makes special excep-
tions for admission of evidence against coconspirators; these excep-
tions provide a foundation for the use of this tactic in multiple-
defendant prosecutions generally. 8  In these particular circum-
stances, the truth-finding value of allowing the prosecutor to present
evidence of non-cooperation outweighs its potential for misuse. Of
course, this tactical procedure also poses some serious risks to the
prosecution." Even if courts are willing to allow the tactic, prosecu-
tors must still weigh carefully their decision to use it, a decision which
of course will be influenced by the other advantages it provides in the
prosecution of organized crime.0
I. CURRENT LAW: THE UNAVAILABLE WITNESS RULE
At present, there are no specific rules that tell courts how to weigh
the evidentiary significance of witnesses' refusal to obey court orders
to testify. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 indicates broadly that "the
privilege of a witness... shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
17. Id.
18. See infra Part II.C (describing use of noncooperating witness's testimony to punish
members of conspiracies).
19. First, when the government confers immunity on a witness, it becomes extremely diffi-
cult to prosecute that individual for any criminal activity discussed during the immunized tes-
timony. Set Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,461-62 (1972). As the Supreme Court held
in Kastigar, "[a] person accorded this immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6002, and subsequently
prosecuted," need only show that he testified under a grant of immunity in order to shift to the
government the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived
from legitimate independent sources. See id. at 460-61; Sugar, supra note 1, at 286 ("As a
rule... a witness once immunized is unlikely to face subsequent prosecution.").
Second, as Judge and former federal prosecutorJohn Gleeson, one of the pioneers of this
strategy, points out, the worst outcome in such a situation is that the witness will not only agree
to testify, but will commit perjury in an effort to exonerate the defendant. "[T]he only thing
worse (for the prosecution) than a recalcitrant witness is one who has falsely exculpated the
defendant under oath." Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note 16, at 1113 n.65. Thus, for the tactic to
be successful, the government must be aware of the range of potential responses available when
it calls a presumably hostile and uncooperative witness, and must also be willing to pursue a
perjury prosecution where necessary to ensure that false testimony is not offered lightly.
20. For a discussion of these consequences, see infra Parts II-III.A.
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States in the light of reason and experience.",2  Rule 501 provides lit-
tle guidance because the lack of clarity provided by the common law
is precisely at issue. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) (2), the
"unavailable witness" rule,22 therefore provides a better place to begin
analysis.
Because the persistence of a witness in refusing to testify even un-
der court order is not a particularly unusual event, legal rules per-
taining to the situation have been codified in the rules of evidence.23
Typically, the availability of a witness will be litigated when one party
seeks to introduce prior statements or prior testimony of the witness
at trial, despite the fact that the witness is seemingly available to pro-
vide first-hand testimony.24 According to this hearsay, a declarant is
to be considered unavailable if he or she "persists in refusing to tes-
tify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement de-
spite an order of the court to do so. ''  The Second Circuit has held
that an actual order of the court is necessary to trigger the unavail-
26
ability exception. The exception does not apply, however, when the
refusal to testify "is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the
proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing the witness
from attending or testifying.,
27
It is hotly disputed whether witnesses who rightfully invoke the
Fifth Amendment privilege, and are under no legal compulsion to
testify, should be considered "unavailable" for the purposes of allow-
ing admission of their prior statements.28 Some have argued that a
prosecutor should be forced either to grant such witnesses immunity
or to forego use of their testimony altogether, rather than permitting
21. FED. R. EVID. 501.
22. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (2) (stating that unavailability of declarant is exception to gen-
eral prohibition against admission of hearsay evidence). Rule 804(a) (2) defines one situation
of unavailability as when a declarant "persists in refusing to testify.., despite an order of the
court to do so." Id.
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944, 953-55 (7th Cir. 1989) (using FED. R.
EVID. 804(b) (5) "unavailable witness" provision to permit admission of grand jury testimony of
witness who, having said he would not testify, was called before the jury and persisted in refus-
ing, despite grant of immunity and court order).
25. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(2).
26. See United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that actual court
order, rather than mere judicial pressure, is necessary because recalcitrant witness who does
not bend to judicial pressure may respond rather than face contempt); see also United States v.
Mathis, 559 F.2d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that, without court order to testify, witness's
threatened refusal to testify was insufficient grounds for finding of unavailability).
27. FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
28. See Rita Werner Gordon, Comment, Right to Immunity for Defense Witnesses, 20 CONN. L.
REv. 153, 153 (1987) (discussing historical development of concept of immunity and whether
witnesses should be compelled to testify in conjunction with grants of immunity or witnesses'
prior hearsay statements should be admissible once witnesses invoke the Fifth Amendment).
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use of the hearsay which prevents the defendant from cross-
examining the witness.' Others have gone so far as to suggest that
defendants themselves should have the power to compel the prosecu-
tor to immunize witnesses who possess information potentially excul-
patory to them but refuse to testify due to fear of self-incrimination.
Courts that have considered the question have uniformly denied de-
fendants any such far-reaching right to compel immunity for defense
witnesses. Such a policy, if allowed, would transfer tremendous
power to the hands of a defendant to constrain the prosecutorial dis-
cretion of the state. 2
Although the "unavailable witness" rule clearly establishes that the
non-privileged, contemptuous witness justifies an exception to the
prohibition on hearsay evidence, it does not resolve the principal
question raised here: Can the jury be made aware that witnesses are
actively refusing to make themselves available to the judicial proc-
ess?3" Because presenting that fact to the jury does not involve any at-
tempt to admit hearsay statements, the unavailable witness rule fails
to resolve the problem. Certainly, Rule 804(a) (2) leaves open the
29. See id. at 153 & n.3 (stating that five federal circuit court decisions have held that, un-
der certain circumstances, criminal defendant has right to compel exculpatory testimony which
is otherwise privileged, thus making immunity necessary in such circumstances (citing United
States v. Todaro, 744 F.2d 5, 9 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Drape, 668 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir.
1982); Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 970 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Klauber, 611
F.2d 512, 517-19 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1081-82 (9th Cir.
1976))).
30. See Gordon, supra note 28, at 189-91 (arguing that, when witness who would supply ex-
culpatory testimony on behalf of defendant cannot do so due to a reasonable fear of self-
incrimination, state may have obligation under Compulsory Witness Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, to immunize them in order to make them "available"); see also Alessio, 528 F.2d at
1080-82 (recognizing right to defense witness immunity if required by fairness).
31. See United States v. Paris, 827 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting obligation to
grant immunity to secure availability of witness); see also Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531,534
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (characterizing immunity as prosecutorial tool not intended for use by de-
fense after defendant attempted to compel prosecutor to grant immunity to witness).
32. Sev AL'sio, 528 F.2d at 1082 ("To interpret the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as confer-
ring on the defendant the power to demand immunity for co-defendants, potential co-
defendants, or others whom the government might in its discretion wish to prosecute would
unacceptably alter the historic role of the Executive Branch in criminal prosecutions."). Al-
though such a power transfer would fundamentally alter the current allocation of prosecutorial
authority, it undeniably enhances a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compel witnesses on
his behalf. The Sixth Amendment provides that, "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. Such power might be mandatory if a defendant is to receive a fair trial,
when witnesses with potentially exculpatory information invoke their Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination.
33. Federal courts have had some opportunity, however, to consider the question. Se
United States v. Deutsch, 987 F.2d 878, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding defense witness could
not assert Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in front of jury and thus ex-
cluding witness); see alsoJohnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1943) (stating that as-
sertions of Fifth Amendment privilege in front ofjury may have disproportionate effects on its
deliberations).
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question of whether the jury can or should be made aware of the rea-
sons why a particular witness is unavailable.
II. PURPOSES OF ELICITING A WITNESS'S REFUSAL TO TESTIFY
In order to present any evidence, a party must demonstrate that
the subject is materially relevant to proving the issue at hand. 4 De-
pending on the particular facts of the case, presentation of a non-
cooperative witness may be relevant for one or more of the following
reasons: to fill gaps in a party's case, to provide "auxiliary evidence,"
or to provide the state with an additional retributive tool.
A. "Gap Filling"
The defendant, by arguing a version of events which makes the tes-
timony of a particular witness important-and the absence of that
witness's testimony therefore especially noteworthy-may create a
context in which the non-testimonial presence of the witness at trial
undermines the credibility of the defendant's account of the facts."5
34. See FED. R. EVID. 402 (stating that relevant evidence is admissible and evidence that is
irrelevant is not admissible). "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. As the
Advisory Committee explained, the prohibition on irrelevant evidence is "a presupposition in-
volved in the very conception of a rational system of evidence." Rules of Evidence for United
States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 217 (1972) (quoting THAYER, PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 264 (1898)). A mere showing of relevance, however, is not sufficient to
guarantee that evidence will be deemed admissible. Many kinds of evidence, such as a coerced
confession or evidence resulting from an unconstitutional search and seizure, may be relevant
to the matter at hand, yet inadmissible at trial. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498-99
(1966) (holding that defendant must be advised of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and have counsel present when he is in custody and subject to interrogation, and concluding
that confessions obtained without these safeguards may not be used as evidence against defen-
dant); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (holding that fruits of unconstitutional search
and seizure are inadmissible in both state and federal courts). At a minimum, the government
must demonstrate that the fact that a witness refuses to testify is relevant to proving the charges
against the defendant. AccordFED. R. EvID. 402 (stating that relevant evidence is admissible and
evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.
35. Such was the case in Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081 (Wyo. 1978), where the defendant was
accused of murdering his two-year-old stepson. In Seyle, the prosecution attempted to prove a
first-degree murder charge by presenting evidence indicating that the defendant had physically
abused the decedent, a two-year-old child. See id. at 1083-84 (stating that physicians testified to
multiple bruises and abrasions on decedent). Denying the allegations of abuse, the defendant
testified that the child sustained the injuries when, while both he and the child were in the
bathroom, the child had a seizure and fell to the floor. See id. at 1083. According to the defen-
dant's own account, the defendant's wife was present in the bathroom and witnessed the entire
event. The defense, however, never called the wife to testify. See id. at 1084. Accordingly, the
defendant's failure to call his wife to corroborate the story raised an inference that the wife's
testimony would have been adverse to the defendant. See id. at 1085-86. The wife's potential
claim of a marital privilege does little to lessen the relevance of the fact that she did not testify.
If she actually had exculpatory testimony to provide, her legal right not to testify does not ex-
plain why she would refuse to do so. Even if her testimony were protected by a marital privi-
lege, in such circumstances, a prosecutor might find it particularly useful to call the witness to
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In organized crime trials, circumstances frequently establish the
relevance of this kind of evidence. Take, for instance, a recent trial
of two members of the Colombo Crime Family for the murder of Co-
lombo consigliere James Angellino.6 In that case, the government
accused two defendants of acting as accomplices in the murder.
37
One defendant allegedly drove the victim from his place of work in
Manhattan to a drop-off point in New Jersey, and another helped
dispose of the body afterwards." As part of their defense these two
defendants claimed that Benny Aloi, a high-ranking member of the
Colombo family, planned Angellino's murder and ordered others to
carry it out." The defendants, however, never indicated any inten-
tion to call Aloi as a witness on their behalf." Instead, the govern-
ment served a subpoena on Aloi, who was already in jail serving a
lengthy prison sentence on an unrelated conviction." Aloi informed
the court that he would refuse to tesify. The government then con-
ferred use immunity on Aloi pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002. Aloi
nonetheless persisted in refusing to testify and was cited for civil con-
tempt. The government sought to compel Aloi to make this refusal
in the presence of the jury, primarily to underscore the lack of sub-
stantiation of the defendants' account.
43
Besides pointing directly to holes or gaps in the defendant's story,
as calling Aloi to the stand was intended to do, the government's act
of calling available but knowingly uncooperative material witnesses
demonstrates its willingness to present those witnesses who are in a
position to know best what happened to thejury. As one court held,
In view of the fact that [the witness] had intimate knowledge of the
the stand and force her to refuse to testify before the jury in order to reinforce the potentially
damning nature of her testimony. SeeFED. R. EVID. 501 (stating that privileges of persons shall
be governed by common law except in actions in which state law provides rule of decision). At
common law, spousal or marital privilege generally refers to marital communications between
a man and woman who are legally married when the communications are made; these com-
munications are protected from involuntary disclosure based on the rationale that confidential
communication between spouses should be encouraged to protect marital relations. See PAUL
R. RICE, EVIDENCE: COMMON LAWAND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 9.01 (A) (1) (3d ed. 1996).
36. See United States v. Legrano, 93 CR 1231 (ARR); United States v. Delucia & Legrano,
1997 WL 616006 (2d Cir.) (Oct. 7, 1997) (affirming convictions of Delucia & Legrano).
37. A 'consigliere" is third in command in the hierarchy of a mob family, and part of the
family's "administration." For a brief description of the administrative structure of La Cosa
Nostra, see United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 1994).
38. Se Legrano, 93 CRat 1231.
39, See id.
40. Ser id.
41. See United States v. Gigante, 94 F.3d 53, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming sentence of
200 months for extortion conviction).
42. See id,
43. See id. The presiding judge refused to allow Aloi to take the contempt in front of the
jury. See id.
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transactions upon which the prosecution was based, [by not calling
the witness] the government ran the risk of argument to the jury by
defense counsel that the government's failure to call an available
witness raised the inference that his testimony would be unfavor-
44
able to the government's case.
By calling Aloi, the government sought to show the jury that it had
no fear of the testimony he would provide. Not only does this tech-
nique point to weaknesses in the defense's case, it also provides the
government with the opportunity to project to the jury a confident,
aggressive, and open prosecutorial style that more fully reveals the
underlying complexities of an organized crime prosecution. Thus,
even if the defense is willing to stipulate that it will not mention the
government's failure to call such witnesses, the government has a
separate and significant interest in actively demonstrating its zeal to
the jury.
45
B. Auxiliary Evidence
A party's right to provide auxiliary evidence when appropriate is a
second important ground of relevance for calling witnesses whom the
government knows will refuse to testify.46 The purpose of auxiliary
evidence is not to provide evidence probative of a central issue, but
rather to shore up the evidence or testimony that is under attack or
impeachment.4 7  Presenting evidence of witness non-cooperation as
auxiliary evidence helps to inoculate the prosecution against a stan-
dard defense strategy of impeaching the character of witnesses who
testify under cooperation agreements. 4' Auxiliary evidence of other
44. United States v. Romero, 249 F.2d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 1957) (explaining that, because
witness had intimate knowledge of transactions upon which prosecution was based, defense
could make argument that failure to call witness demonstrated likelihood that witness's testi-
mony would have been unfavorable to government).
45. See Robert H. Stier, Jr., Revisiting the Missing Witness Inference-Quieling lhe Loud Voice
from the Empty Chair, 44 MD. L. REv. 137, 160-66 (1985) (discussing implications of failure to call
obvious witness in criminal cases).
46. See FED. R. EVID. 104 (stating that evidence may be admitted subject to subsequent evi-
dence fulfilling necessary condition and evidence regarding weight or credibility of other evi-
dence is relevant); see also FED. R. EvID. 403 (stating that relevant evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues," time considerations or probability of misleadingjury).
47. See De Camp v. United States, 10 F.2d 984,985 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (ruling permissible the
exclusion of certain auxiliary evidence of manufacturing processes to disprove prosecution's
assertions in course of mail fraud trial). If an opposing party has made no effort to challenge
admitted evidence, auxiliary evidence may be deemed cumulative or not relevant and may
properly be excluded. SeeJohn McArthur Maguire & Robert C. Vincent, Admissions Implied from
Spoliation, 45 YALE L.J. 226, 235-36, 247-49 (1935) (arguing that spoliation evidence should be
used primarily for impeachment purposes).
48. See David Crump, On the Uses of Irrelevant Evidence, 34 HoUs. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1997)
(discussing various reasons for introducing evidence that is relevant only in its relationship to
other evidence's weight or credibility).
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witnesses' refusal to testify starkly reveals why the prosecution must
base its principal case on the testimony of sometimes shockingly un-
savory characters. 9
In organized crime trials, the government often relies heavily on
the testimony of one or more cooperating witnesses.50 These wit-
nesses tend to be fellow members of the organized crime family
whom the government has persuaded to plead guilty and cooperate
rather than stand trial themselves." Often such witnesses have crimi-
nal records as bad as or worse than the defendants against whom they
are testifying.52  For example, the eyewitness testimony of Gambino
family underboss Sammy "The Bull" Gravano was pivotal in the gov-
ernment's case against Gambino boss John Gotti and a large number
of lesser figures.5 Without Gravano's cooperating testimony, it is
significantly less likely that the government would have secured con-
victions. 4
As part of their plea agreements, cooperators are required to con-
fess to the government their entire histories of criminal activity.5 No
significant omissions are tolerated. If evidence later turns up indicat-
ing that cooperators have lied or concealed their role in any signifi-
cant criminal activity, the agreements may be torn up and the coop-
erators prosecuted for any and all of the crimes that they have
already reported to the government.' Cooperators thus have strong
incentives to be truthful about their misdeeds from the beginning of
49. See David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33
UCLA L. REv. 1063, 1116 (1986) (stating government is most likely to seek information about
crimes from criminals).
50. See Karen Anderson & Megan Bertron, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
617, 635 (1996) (discussing federal rules of evidence regarding admissibility of co-conspirator
statements).
51. See United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 317 (1992) (describing fraud and racketeer-
ing case where prosecution granted prosecution immunity to two witnesses, but after witnesses
testified before grand jury, prosecution uncovered new evidence against witnesses, and wit-
nesses then refused to testify at trial by invoking their Fifth Amendment privileges); United
States v. Gotti, 171 F.R.D. 19, 21-22 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (indicating that witness entered into plea
agreement with government to testify against two defendants).
52. See Gotti, 171 F.R.D. at 26 (acknowledging that evidence was produced tying witness to
various murders and criminal activities after he began his cooperation with government).
53. See United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 363 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that bulk of gov-
ernment's case came from Gravano's testimony and circumstantial evidence obtained from
electronic surveillance), cert. deniel, 116 S. Ct. 1671 (1996).
54. See id. (commenting that Gravano's persuasive testimony tended to connect only
Thomas Gambino to loansharking, and tended to exonerate Giuseppe Gambino; noting that
jury acquitted Giuseppe but convicted Thomas).
55. See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. LJ. 69,95-97 (1995) (discussing
nature of plea agreements and what cooperators must agree to do).
56. See id. at 91-98 (indicating circumstances under which plea agreements may be voided
by either prosecutor or defendant).
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their tenure of cooperation. Although the existence of these often
extensive criminal records inoculates the government against charges
that the cooperators are concealing their own role in criminal activi-
ties, it can also cut against the prosecution, because the substance of
the plea agreement is available to defense counsel for impeachment
purposes. 8 Gravano, for instance, personally confessed to participa-
tion in the murders of nineteen individuals. 9 In such cases, an obvi-
ous and often effective defense strategy is to attack the credibility of
cooperating witnesses so relentlessly as to impeach both the witnesses
and the character of the entire government case in the eyes of the
jury
In order to diffuse the force of this argument, the government
must rely on two responses. First, it can point out that regardless of
the unsavory character of its witnesses, the structure of the coopera-
tion agreement creates powerful incentives for cooperators to tell the
truth.6' Second, it can argue that individuals of more upstanding
character are simply not in a position to know anything about the in-
ner workings of organized crime, thus making cooperation with these
unsavory characters a practical necessity of evidence gathering in
prosecutions against organized crime figures.
57. See FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.1 (1994) (providing that, tinder
circumstances set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1994), govern-
ment may make a motion (known as a "5K motion") asking the sentencing judge to depart
downward from the Guidelines when defendant "has provided substantial assistance in the in-
vestigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense"). Such assistance
may justify a sentence below the statutorily required minimum sentence. See id.
58. See United States v. Mizell, 88 F.3d 288, 293-94 (5th Cir.) (describing defense's 5K mo-
tion to introduce plea bargain into evidence suggesting that prosecution's witness had selective
memory about elements of crime that were necessary to get him plea bargain), cert. dpnied, 116
S. Ct. 620 (1996); United States v. Cobbins, 749 F. Supp. 1450, 1462 (E.D. La. 1990) (observing
that where government acts in bad faith in not making 5K motion, defendant has right to detail
cooperative efforts at sentencing hearing, and court has independent obligation to consider
such evidence).
59. Sex Gambino, 59 F.3d at 366 ("Defense counsel referred to Gravano in his opening
statement as a 'serial killer' who had 'participated in the slaughter and deaths of nineteen hu-
man beings.'").
60. See id. at 366-68 (noting that prior criminal acts impeached Gravano's credibility and
enabled defense to suggest that government had abusively targeted and investigated Gambino
for years with little success prior to Gravano's cooperation).
61. See United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 828-29 (5th Cir. 1989) (explaining that Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines aim to assist courts in imposing appropriate sentences and are not
"rigid, mechanical requirements"). The courts, rather than the prosecution, control the final
sentencing outcome imposed on the cooperating witness, presumably ensuring that a witness
will not be rewarded for providing falsely inculpatory testimony in order simply to please the
government. See id. The government is limited to making a 5K motion or providing a 5K letter
indicating the government's satisfaction with the cooperation of the witness, and recommend-
ing a downward departure. See id. The actual sentence imposed remains in the discretion of
the sentencingjudge who must be satisfied as to the veracity of the cooperator's testimony. Sff
id.
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Although these arguments might hold some logical appeal to the
average juror, they are far from perfect foils to the typical impeach-
ment spectacle, in which defense counsel leads a cooperating ac-
complice witness through a grueling recapitulation of crimes for
hours, and sometimes days. Such a process undoubtedly creates a
strong impression of witness "taint" that the prosecution cannot eas-
ily rebut by mere logical argument.
But the government has a logical response. Calling predictably
unresponsive witnesses who clearly could give relevant testimony
powerfully demonstrates why the government's case must rely so
heavily on cooperative witnesses with "deals" rather than on more
conventional witnesses. As the jury learns, those witnesses simply ref-
use to testify.62 When the defense depends substantially on the im-
peachment of cooperating witnesses, auxiliary evidence presented
through use of the tactic is highly relevant.
C. Incapacitative and Retributive Function
A third and more controversial reason to call uncooperative wit-
nesses to testify is to provide the state with additional means to inca-
pacitate criminal enterprises and punish their members. In this way,
the tactic serves less an evidentiary than a retributive function. The
device secures retributive ends in two ways. First, it punishes those
who renounce their duty as citizens to cooperate with the authorities
and to report felonies. Misprision-of-felony statutes, long a part of
the criminal law, are based on the assumption that all citizens share
in this duty. Second, the ability to levy criminal contempt charges
against organized crime figures who refuse to cooperate or who lie
on the stand provides the government with an additional tool to in-
carcerate or to increase the amount of jail-time served by such fig-
ures: "between perjury prosecutions and contempts, the.., process
can produce the incarceration of significant parts of the criminal en-
terprise."'4 For instance, in United States v. Conte,65 prosecutors pursu-
62. S'eUnited States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522, 1533-34 (1 th Cir. 1989) (permitting defense
counsel's comment on silence of six codefendants because comment was relevant in explaining
lack of corroboration to defendant's story).
63. See CHARLES E. TORcIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 572 (15th ed. 1996) (remarking
that misprision of felony at common law has become obsolete in America, but is still recog-
nized by federal statute and occurs when a person knows of commission of felony and conceals
offense from authorities).
64. Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note 16, at 1115 (arguing that prosecuting perjurers and cit-
ing witnesses for contempt provides additional criminal sanctions for criminals in addition to
prosecuting them for their substantive crimes).
65. 93 CR 85 (ILG); sm. also United States v. Versaglio, 96 F.3d 637 (2d Cir. 1996)
[hereinafter Versaglio I]]; United States v. Versaglio, 85 F.3d 943 (2d Cir. 1996) [hereinafter
Versaglio 1] (explaining circumstances of United States v. Conte, 93 CR 85 (ILG)).
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ing a multi-count RICO case against members of the Gambino Crime
Family called to the stand two members of the family who were al-
ready serving time on other charges. Outside the presence of the
jury, the witnesses invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege and were
immunized. The witnesses then were questioned before the jury and,
despite the grant of immunity, continued to refuse to answer. The
witnesses were held in civil contempt and, following the trial, were
prosecuted for and convicted of criminal contempt.6
Similarly, in a trial against Thomas Gambino on charges that he
gave false, evasive and misleading testimony to a grand jury, prosecu-
tors immunized fellow Gambino family member George Remini and
sought to compel his testimony. Despite the immunity order,
Remini refused to testify, and although Gambino was acquitted,
Remini was subsequently sentenced for criminal contempt.' Al-
though the main target of the prosecution was not convicted, the tac-
tic at least succeeded in securing the incarceration of one member of
the criminal enterprise.6
Purposefully calling uncooperative witnesses attacks one of the
fundamental bonds that sustains organized crime: the code of si-
lence, or, as it is known among Mafia members, omerta.70 By placing
members of the organization in the difficult position of having either
to break the code or face certain coercive state sanctions, the tactic
increases the costs of membership in the criminal conspiracy. Mem-
bership alone, which is not in itself a criminal offense but is nonethe-
less a prerequisite for the commission and sustenance of organized
crime, can then become a collateral target of attack by the state.7'
For the purposes of meeting the Rule 401 relevance requirement,
the first two justifications for calling such witnesses, highlighting
noteworthy gaps in the defense case and rebutting impeachment of
cooperating witnesses, provide a sufficient basis for admission in most
66. See Conte, 93 CR 85; see also United States v. Cefalu, 85 F.3d 964 (2d Cir. 1996); United
States v. Cefalu & Versaglio, 94 CR 94 & 95 (ERK) (unreported case).
67. See United States v. Remini, 967 F.2d 754, 755 (2d Cir. 1992) (describing defendant's
claim that immunity order was inadequate).
68. See id. at 756 (reciting trial court's sentence of sixteen months imprisonment, $30,000
fine, three years supervised release, and $50.00 "special assessment").
69. See id. at 760 (dismissing defendant's arguments and affirming lower court's contempt
conviction); see also Versaglio 1, 85 F.3d at 945 (discussing sentencing under Federal Sentencing
Guidelines of Gambino Crime Family member convicted of criminal contempt after refusing to
testify despite grant of immunity).
70. See I LEON RADZINOWICZ & MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, CRIME ANDJUSTICE: THE CRIMINAL
IN SOciEiy 335-36 (1971) (discussing code of silence in Mafia).
71. See Versaglio 1, 85 F.3d at 944 (describing appellant's contempt conviction after refusing
to testify against member of Gambino Crime Family in trial that ended in mistrial); Remini, 967
F.2d at 755 (describing appellant's prosecution for contempt despite acquittal of individual
appellant was to testify against).
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circumstances. The third justification suggested here, incapacitating
criminal enterprises and punishing their members, is also a legiti-
mate government purpose, but that purpose in itself cannot justify
the admission of evidence that is not relevant in the case against the
accused .
III. BEYOND "GAP FILLING": PERMISSIBLE INFERENCES
Thus far, this Article has identified two primary evidentiary uses of
witness non-cooperation: to reveal significant gaps in the defen-
dant's case,7 and to illustrate the difficulty that the state encounters
in finding willing witnesses with relevant information, explaining to
the jury the need to negotiate deals with indisputably unsavory char-
acters.74 For these purposes, calling witnesses that the state knows will
refuse to testify is relevant and falls within the bounds of fair play.7
There is, however, another much more controversial evidentiary
use of witness non-cooperation. Employed most aggressively, the fact
of witness non-cooperation could provide the basis for a whole range
of inferences about the factual substance of the case that the prosecu-
tion can suggest at trial and, perhaps, even argue in closing argu-
mentY' Prosecutors may seek to draw these inferences in situations
both where the non-cooperating witness retains a Fifth Amendment
privilege, and where the witness lacks the privilege. This Article ar-
gues that the presence or absence of the privilege is a critical factor
in determining when witness non-cooperation should be admitted as
evidence against a defendant.
77
A. Inferences and the Fifth Amendment Privilege
To date, the Supreme Court has been much more concerned with
the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege than with the evi-
72. See FED. R. EvID. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be before the occurrence.") (emphasis added).
73. See supra Part II.A (discussing 'gap-filling' function of calling uncooperative witnesses).
74. See supra Part II.B (discussing use of non-cooperating witnesses as auxiliary evidence to
shore up testimony of other coconspirators).
75. See Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 189 (1963) (rejecting argument of prosecuto-
rial misconduct after government called witnesses knowing that they would invoke their Fifth
Amendment rights in response to questions).
76. See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1988) (affirming conviction where
prosecutor referenced defendant's invocation of Fifth Amendment right during closing argu-
ments).
77. See Martin D. Litt, Note, Commentary by Co-Defendant's Counsel on Defendant's Refusal To
Testify, A Violation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 89 MICH. L. RE%. 1008, 1008-09
(1991) (identifying split between Federal Courts of Appeals regarding propriety of allowing co-
defendant's counsel to comment on defendant's silence and difficulty of fashioning appropri-
ate test to evaluate practice).
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dentiary significance of witness non-cooperation. In the landmark
Fifth Amendment case of Griffin v. California78 the Supreme Court
held that any mention by the government of the defendant's decision
to take the Fifth unconstitutionally burdens the privilege and is
therefore impermissible." The Court has never resolved the ques-
tion, however, of whether it is likewise impermissible to call the jury's
attention to the use of the privilege when the person invoking the
privilege is not the defendant but rather a third-party witness."
The circuit courts are split on the question.8' As one commentator
observes, "some courts require the privilege to be invoked in the fact-
finder's presence while others consider this to be prejudicial error. '" 2
Both the Eighth and the Ninth Circuits have found the practice im-
permissible.I The majority of the circuits considering the question
have indicated that, even if admission of such evidence is not neces-
sarily constitutional error, the trial judge possesses the discretion to
78. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
79. See id. at 615 (holding that prosecutor's closing arguments referencing defendant's
failure to testify violated defendant's Fifth Amendment right). State courts have energetically
followed the Supreme Court's lead. As one Pennsylvania court stated, "[I]f the prosecuting
attorney or the judge makes the slightest reference to the fact that the accused failed to reply to
the accusations ringing against him, and a verdict of guilt follows, a new trial is imperative."
Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 227 A.2d 904, 906 (Pa. 1967); see also Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S.
288 (1981) (holding that defendant has a right to have jury instructed not to draw an inference
against defendant based on defendant's failure to testify).
80. Over the dissenting opinion of two Supreme Court Justices, the Court denied a peti-
tion for certiorari in a case raising the issue. See Lindsey v. United States, 484 U.S. 934, 934-35
(1987) (White, J., dissenting to denial of certiorari) (describing split among circuits and argu-
ing that Court should grant certiorari to resolve dispute). In the pre-Griffzn period, when the
Model Code of Evidence was drafted, the drafters assumed that comment on witnesses' taking a
privilege was acceptable. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 233 (1942) ("There can be no
weighty objection on the ground that the comment will lessen the value of the privilege."). In
civil cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that adverse inferences based on the privilege are
permissible. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 317-18 (1976) (holding that adverse infer-
ences may be drawn from inmate's silence during disciplinary hearing); see also LiButti v.
United States, 107 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1997).
81. See Lindsey, 484 U.S. at 934-35 (White,J., dissenting to denial of certiorari).
82. Bartel, supra note 13, at 1356.
83. See United States v. King, 461 F.2d 53, 57 (8th Cir. 1972) (reversing conviction where
"[n]o useful purpose was served by calling these witnesses other than in forcing them to take
the privilege in a manner obviously prejudicial to the defendant"); United States v. Beye, 445
F.2d 1037, 1038 (9th Cir. 1971) (refusing defendant's request that witness be made to take Fifth
in jury's presence). Many circuits have held that a witness should not be made to claim the
privilege before the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Deutsch, 987 F.2d 878, 882 (2d Cir. 1993)
(denying defendant's request to call witness before jury knowing that witness would invoke
Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213, 1220 (5th Cir. 1975)
(remanding case after trial judge accepted witness's claim of Fifth Amendment privilege with-
out determining if claim was appropriate); United States v.Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st
Cir. 1973) (stating that neither party has right to inferences jury might draw by allowing witness
to testify knowing that witness will take Fifth); United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d 1153, 1160
(10th Cir. 1973) (reversing conviction because of prosecution's extensive questioning of wit-
ness in front ofjury with prior knowledge that witness would take Fifth).
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bar such witnesses from testifying. Still, the practice continues to be
used, with judicial sanction, in some circuits. In the Sixth Circuit's
view:
Government counsel need not refrain from calling a witness whose
attorney appears in court and advises court and counsel that the
witness will claim his privilege and will not testify. However, to call
such a witness, counsel must have an honest belief that the witness
has information which is pertinent to the issues in the case and
which is admissible under applicable rules of evidence, if no privi-
lege were claimed. It is an unfair trial tactic if it appears that coun-
sel calls such a witness merely to get him to claim his privilege be-
fore the jury to a series of questions not pertinent to the issues on
trial or not admissible under applicable rules of evidence.
85
Although the Sixth Circuit has allowed such witnesses to be called
for the purposes of invoking the privilege before the jury, it also has
warned that the practice is "so imbued with the 'potential for unfair
prejudice' that a trial judge should closely scrutinize any such re-
quest. '"m The Sixth Circuit has reversed in one instance where the
prosecutor persisted in questioning the witness extensively after the
privilege was invoked; 7 nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit continues to
allow the practice in general!s8 Accordingly, it found no reversible
error when a trial court permitted a witness to invoke the privilege
before the jury and gave the jury a cautionary instruction not to con-
sider the incident unfavorably against the defendant.89
84. See United States v. George, 778 F.2d 556, 562-63 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by judge's refusal of defendant's request to call wit-
ness who had already stated his intention to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege); United
States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1298 (7th Cir. 1976) (rejecting defendant's claim that trial
judge should have examined basis of witness's claims of Fifth Amendment privilege where de-
fendant earlier requested judge to recuse himself because of his extensive knowledge of wit-
ness's alleged criminal activities); United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237, 1240 (5th Cir.
1974) (holding that witness's taking of Fifth may not be made known to jury or commented on
by defense counsel); Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 541-42 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (affirming
trial court's rejection of defendant's request to have witness classified as"missing witness" after
judge refused to allow witness to testify when it became clear that witness would invoke the
Fifth Amendment).
85. United States v. Compton, 365 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1966).
86. United States v. Vandetti, 623 F.2d 1144, 1147 (6th Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v.
Maffei, 450 F.2d 928, 929 (6th Cir. 1971)).
87. See United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 650 (6th Cir. 1975) ("In short [the govern-
ment] went too far and exceeded the reasonable bounds which might have been necessary to
test the privilege.").
88. See id.
89. See United States v. Lewis, Nos. 86-5377, 86-5379, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 5183, at * 10-12
(6th Cir. Apr. 17, 1987) (affirming defendant's conviction despite prosecutor's reference in
closing arguments to witness taking the Fifth); see also Vandetti, 623 F.2d at 1147 (finding no
error in "merely permitting" previously convicted co-defendants to be called as witnesses).
State courts also are split regarding the practice. In Commonwealth v. Sims, 521 A.2d 391, 395
(Pa. 1987), the court found a proper basis for allowing the privilege to be invoked before the
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1. Adverse inferences and the Fifth Amendment
The permissibility of an inference is strongly dependent on the po-
tential array of reasons that might motivate a particular witness to re-
fuse to cooperate. Although the government may rightfully be able
to compel a witness to invoke a privilege before the jury, few circum-
stances would justify permitting the state to then ask the jury to draw
adverse inferences against the defendant based on the witness's invo-
cation of the privilege. As one commentator has noted, "[p]lainly,
the inference may not ordinarily be made against a party when a wit-
ness for that party claims a privilege personal to the witness, for this is
not a matter under the party's control."9 Thus, in the vast majority
of cases where the government has been permitted to call such wit-
nesses, the trial judge promptly instructs the jury not to make any in-
ferences adverse to the defendant based on the privilege.9'
There are three main reasons generally offered for adhering to
this prohibition. First, as noted above, the invocation of the privi-
lege, or more generally, the refusal to testify, is not directly within the
control of the defendant.92 It would be unjust, it is argued, to penal-
ize the defendant for independent decisions made by a party not on
trial.9 The flaw in this argument, however, is that defendants gener-
ally lack control over the nature of evidence admitted against them at
trial. The defendant can neither choose whom the government calls
to testify as a witness, nor control the nature of the testimony pro-
vided by such witnesses. It is not at all evident that drawing infer-
ences based on nontestimonial evidence over which the defendant
lacks control is any more damaging to the defendant's case than al-
lowing inferences to be drawn from other evidence offered against
the defendant.
94
jury because it provided important information for evaluating the testimony of the government
witnesses' credibility and reliability. See Stringer v. State, 500 So. 2d 928, 940 (Miss. 1986)
(holding that prosecutor's comments during closing argument regarding defendant's refusal
to testify did not amount to error and violated defendants fundamental right to a fair trial).
But cf. Stanger v. Gordon, 244 N.W.2d 628, 632 (Minn. 1976) (reproving plaintiff for"adverse
comment on the proper assertion of privilege in the presence of the jury").
90. EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 74.1, at 177 (3d ed. 1984)
(discussing inferences that may be drawn from witness's refusal to testify due to privilege).
91. But see infra notes 115-23 (discussing Namet).
92. See CLEARY ET AL., supra note 90, at 296-97 (describing inherent unfairness of drawing
negative inferences against defendant because of witness's failure to testify).
93. See id. (arguing against negative inferences made when witness refuses to testify, de-
scribing such inferences as denying witness "the protection which, for public purposes, the law
affords him, and utterly tak[ing] away a privilege" (citing Wentworth v. Lloyd, 10 H.L. Cas. 589,
591 (1864))).
94. See United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1959) (describing difficult po-
sition courts are in when deciding whether to allow comment on witnesses' failure to testify
because either way, one of the parties may be hurt).
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A second reason often suggested for not allowing adverse infer-
ences to be drawn from a witness's invocation of the privilege is that
such inferences demean or diminish the privilege itself.9 5 In Grune-
wald v. United States,9 Justice Black's concurring opinion argued that
placing constraints on, or punishing the appropriate use of the right
to refrain from testifying by making such use costly undermines the
privilege's actual value. As Justice Black noted, "[t]he value of con-
stitutional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be penalized
for relying on them."9 Although this argument makes sense in the
case of the defendant's own decision to 'take the Fifth,' such logic
has significantly less force in the case of non-party witnesses." Infer-
ences made against the defendant based on the witnesses' use of
privileges burden the right against self-incrimination only to the ex-
tent that the witnesses' own consciences chaff when they fail to pro-
vide material testimony out of self-interest.
A third and much more powerful reason to disfavor inferences
based on witnesses' invocation of the privilege is the inherent ambi-
guity of such inferences. When witnesses are asked a question the
answer to which is potentially damaging to the defendant, and the
witnesses refuse to answer it on Fifth Amendment grounds, the jury
cannot know whether the witnesses' withheld testimony would have
inculpated or exculpated the defendant. All that the jury can infer
from such a refusal is that the witnesses might have perceived the an-
swer to be potentially incriminating to themselves."'
Further, if unchecked, the government could seriously misuse such
a tactic. Although much evidence by itself may be ambiguous, thus
requiring counsel to contextualize it and thereby imbue it with mean-
ing, it is possible that by using this technique the government could
create an aura of culpability around a defendant by arguing highly
speculative inferences, without presenting any truly probative evi-
dence. Were the government to call a series of witnesses, initiating in
each case a line of suggestive questioning implicating the defendant,
and were each witness to invoke the privilege in response, it would be
95. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 425 (1957) (Black, J., concurring)
(arguing that impeachment of witness is never justified based on witness's use of constitutional
privilege).
96. Se, id. at 391.
97. S-e id. at 425-26.
98. Id. at 425.
99. See Maloney, 262 F.2d at 538 (holding that witnesses may be called to stand with knowl-
edge that they will invoke their Fifth Amendment rights only ifjudge admonishes jury not to
draw inferences from lack of testimony).
100. Se CLEARY ET AL., supra note 90, at 318-19 (describing judges' inability to supervise
fact-finder's decisionmaking process).
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difficult for the defendant to dispel the resulting cloud of suspicion.
This practice, which seeks to prove the criminality of the defendant
by demonstrating association with "suspicious" persons, is a nearly
definitional illustration of prejudicial evidence.' ' On the other
hand, the government's failure to call witnesses who obviously could
contribute information to the government's case under the "gap-
filling" function could, if left unexplained, seriously damage the gov-
ernment's ability to make its case. 0 2
The Supreme Court set forth the primary test to determine when
drawing inferences based on the non-cooperation of a privileged wit-
ness in a criminal trial is impermissible in Namet v. United States.'Y In
Namet, three defendants were charged with violating federal wagering
tax laws, and all pleaded not guilty.' On the day of the trial, how-
ever, two of the defendants changed their pleas to guilty and were
called to testify against the remaining defendant.'0 ' Their lawyer
warned the court that they were likely to claim the privilege because
they had pled guilty on the principal charges, but remained subject
to an IRS investigation.' °6 At trial, the government called both wit-
nesses; both answered some questions, but invoked the privilege in
order to avoid answering certain questions they deemed self-
incriminating.0 7 At the close of the trial, the judge instructed the
jury that no inference should "be drawn against [the defendant] be-
cause the [witnesses] refused to testify, unless it would be a logical in-
ference that would appeal to you as having a direct bearing upon the
defendant's guilt.
"
,108
While noting the potential for abuse inherent in forcing a witness
to invoke the privilege before a jury, the Supreme Court concluded
that neither the instruction nor the government's decision to call the
witnesses violated any substantial rights of the defendant.'" Examin-
101. One commentator describes prejudicial evidence as that which "has a tendency to
cause the trier of fact to commit an inferential error." VictorJ. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence
403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 498-99
(1983) (describing vagueness and ambiguities surrounding unfairly prejudicial evidence rule).
102. More specifically, the failure or inability of the prosecution to call witnesses whom it
knows will "take the Fifth" may shift the negative inference onto the prosecution's case. See Ma-
loney, 262 F.2d at 537 (describing government's argument for allowing prosecution to call wit-
nesses it knew would refuse to answer questions on grounds of the privilege against self-
incrimination).
103. 373 U.S. 179 (1963).
104. See id. at 180.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 181.
107. See id. at 181-82, 184-85 (describing opposition of witnesses' attorneys to requiring wit-
nesses to take the Fifth on the stand).
108. Id. at 185.
109. See id. at 190-91 (holding that, even if instruction was wrong, it did not affect defen-
126
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ing lower court decisions on the question, the Court noted two prin-
cipal theories for finding reversible error in such circumstances."1 '
One theory requires a court to inquire whether "the Government
ma[de] a conscious and flagrant attempt to build its case out of in-
ferences arising from use of the testimonial privilege."'' . According
to this theory, examined further in the next section, reversible error
exists where malicious intent rises to the level of prosecutorial mis-
conduct."2  Alternatively, grounds for reversal may exist where
"inferences from a witness's refusal to answer added critical weight to
the prosecution's case in a form not subject to cross-examination,
and thus unfairly prejudiced the defendant."" This raises issues un-
der the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause,"' which this Arti-
cle discusses in Part IV.
2. The prosecutorial misconduct theory
Underlying the prosecutorial misconduct theory discussed in
Namet v. United States is a view that misconduct occurs when the state
"makes a conscious and flagrant attempt to build its case out of infer-
ences arising from use of the testimonial privilege.""5 In Namet, how-
ever, the Court refused to find reversible error under this theory, in
part because even though the trial court compelled the witnesses to
invoke their privilege before the jury, the prosecutors had a good-
faith basis for believing that the witnesses had no lawful right to claim
the privilege." 6 As the Court noted, "certainly the prosecutor need
not accept at face value every asserted claim of privilege, no matter
how frivolous."' 7 As the Court recognized, without some judicial su-
pervision, the unjustified invocation of the privilege could severely
dant's substantial rights and therefore would not be reversible error).
110. See id. at 186-87 (citing prosecutorial misconduct theory from United States v. Ma-
loney, 262 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1959), and the theory that witnesses invoking privilege in front of
jury unfairly prejudices jury).
111. Id. at 186.
112. See id. (describing government attempt "to build its case out of inferences arising from
use of the testimonial privilege" as reversible error).
113. Id. at 187 (citing Maloney, 262 F.2d at 536-37).
114. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
115. Namel, 373 U.S. at 186 (implying that prosecutorial misconduct may have occurred
had witnesses not possessed relevant, non-privileged information important to prosecution's
case). "It is an unfair trial tactic if it appears that counsel calls such a witness merely to get him
to claim his privilege before the jury to a series of questions not pertinent to the issues on trial
or not admissible under applicable rules of evidence." United States v. Lewis, Nos. 86-5377, 86-
5379, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 5183, at *11-12 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 1987).
116. See Namet, 373 U.S. at188.
117. See id.
1997]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERsITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:105
impede the government's ability to secure witnesses to testify in
criminal trials."8
Moreover, even where the prosecutor knows that the witness both
has a right to invoke the privilege and plans to do so, merely calling
the witness has been held not to violate the Namet misconduct theory,
at least where the prosecutor has "an honest belief that the witness
has information which is pertinent to the issues in the case and which
is admissible under applicable rules of evidence, if no privilege were
claimed."'".9 The Sixth Circuit noted that such a procedure is pre-
sumptively reasonable "where the prosecution's case would be seri-
ously prejudiced by a failure to offer him as a witness. ' 2°
The primary reason such behavior has been dubbed "misconduct"
is because of its inherent ambiguity. For a witness who fears self-
incrimination, the decision to withhold testimony may have nothing
to do with the culpability of the defendant, but rather may be moti-
vated solely by the witness's own desire to protect himself.12' The in-
ferences that arise from such invocation, however, may be powerfully
incriminating to the defendant.2 2 The ambiguity as to the motivation
for the refusal to testify thus makes any inferences drawn from the in-
vocation of the privilege inherently untrustworthy. A prosecutor who
seeks to manipulate this inherent ambiguity in such a way that it ap-
pears to inculpate the defendant is acting in bad faith, and the mis-
conduct theory of Namet appropriately mandates exclusion of the
evidence.
23
3. No Fifth, no problem: adverse inferences in the absence of the privilege
When faced with a witness who hides behind the Fifth Amend-
ment, however, the government's hands are far from tied. Because it
possesses the ability to immunize,2 4 the government can waive its
right to prosecute the individual in exchange for an obligation to tes-
118. See id. (reasoning that government may challenge a witness's intention to claim privi-
lege if there is "independent and quite proper reason" for calling witness).
119. Lewis, 1987 U.S.App. LEXIS 5183, at *12.
120. Id. (quoting United States v. Kilpatrick, 477 F.2d 357, 360 (6th Cir. 1973)).
121. See Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557 (1956) ("[A] witness may
have a reasonable fear of prosecution and yet be innocent of any wrongdoing.").
122. As Judge Learned Hand pointed out, "[w]hen a witness claims his privilege, a natural,
indeed an almost inevitable, inference arises as to what would have been his answer if he had
not refused." United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1959).
123. See Namet, 373 U.S. at 188 (finding "planned or deliberate attempts by government to
make capital out of the witness's refusal to testify" would be inadmissible evidence).
124. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1994); see also supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing
government's ability to use immunity statutes and other benefits such as cash payments and
witness protection programs).
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tify if the testimony of a particular witness is of sufficient importance
to the state."
A witness can no longer legitimately fear self-incrimination where
immunity has been conferred, or where they have already pled guilty
or been convicted.' 26 Under such circumstances, the most plausible
motivations behind a witness's refusal to testify, even in the face of a
court order, are those thatjustify an adverse inference against the de-
fendant. Although the government should resist "consciously and
flagrantly" using a witness's invocation of a valid privilege to draw ad-
verse inferences against a defendant, by no means should the con-
cern of protecting the privilege when self-incrimination is no longer
an issue obscure the broader goals at stake in conspiracy and organ-
ized crime prosecutions. 27
The reasons for non-cooperation might be as numerous as there
are witnesses, but reasons powerful enough to compel a witness to
suffer the heavy sanctions resulting from citation for civil contempt
and criminal contempt or both are more limited.'2  In most cases
when a witness refuses to testify despite lacking a legitimate fear of
self-incrimination, '2 non-cooperation is likely to stem from one of
four main reasons."O
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002.
126. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
127. See FBI, "A Banner Year"for Mob Prosecutions, CHi. TRIB., Jan. 2, 1991, at 14 [hereinafter
FBI] (discussing FBI's successful tactics targeting heads of crime families and breaking down
their hierarchies).
128. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (providing for confinement of "recalcitrant
witnesses" upon refusing to testify). Though these motivations obviously are impossible to
categorize exhaustively, it is possible to identify some of the predominant motivations for non-
cooperation within the organized crime and conspiracy context. If other reasons exist for wit-
ness non-cooperation, counsel always remains free to argue them to the jury. See Crowley v.
Winans, 920 F.2d 454, 454 (7th Cir. 1990) (pointing out that nature of permissive presumption
is that it allows trier of fact to draw an inference but does not require trier of fact to draw an
inference). Their plausibility, therefore, like a broad range of other issues implicating the
credibility of witnesses and other evidence, is an issue of fact that counsel should be forced to
address at trial. See id.
129. A large number of cases involving an immunized witness's refusal to cooperate stem
from claims of incomplete privilege. A witness may argue that, though he or she has been
granted some kind of limited immunity, or has already been convicted of the crimes stemming
from the incident about which he is testifying, the collateral consequences of testifying might
nonetheless work to his or her disadvantage. See, e.g., Mikutaitis v. United States, 478 U.S. 1306
(1986) (fear of foreigu prosecution). For instance, some witnesses have been called to testify
after conviction, but prior to sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Giraldo, 822 F.2d 205, 208
(2d Cir. 1987) (upon retracting cooperation, judge sentenced witness to forty years with no
chance of parole; witness then cooperated and judge reduced sentence to four years with pa-
role). Federal prosecutors have immunized others, but the witnesses nonetheless remain liable
for prosecution in another forum. This Article only considers witnesses to be lacking a privi-
lege if such collateral harms cannot realistically befall them.
130. See28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1994) (allowing contemnor to refuse to testify forjust cause).
Individuals have successfully refused to testify under this provision by claiming that the ques-
tions propounded to the defendant were based on illegally gathered evidence, see Gelbard v.
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First, a witness might refuse to testify in fear of the defen-
dant.' MAlthough understandable, such refusal is not legally cogniza-
ble, and the witness will still be subject to civil or criminal contempt
charges.132  If a witness's fear of a defendant is sufficient to compel
that witness to violate a court order and place himself in contempt of
court, an adverse inference would seem especially warranted. It
would be perverse for a defendant's coercive threats to allow the de-
fendant to escape punishment while the victim of that coercion, the
witness, goes to jail. The Federal Rules of Evidence already provide
for admission of hearsay statements where the unavailability of a wit-
ness results from the coercive or obstructive efforts by the defen-
dant.33 Thus, where a legitimate fear of violent retaliation motivates
the witness's refusal to testify, there seems to be ample justification
for drawing adverse inferences based on the witness's behavior.
Second, a witness may refuse to testify out of a desire to adhere to a
code of silence. The force of the code of silence, or omerta, may
spring from internal assimilation of a set of values adverse to the du-
ties imposed by the criminal justice system.'3 It also may be enforced
from without by other members of the criminal organization seeking
to quiet 'squealers,' perhaps with extreme threats of force and vio-
lence.'35 If the fear stems from other members of the criminal or-
United States, 408 U.S. 41, 44 (1972), and that some procedural right of the witness has been
violated, see United States v. Di Girlomo, 393 F. Supp. 997, 1000 (W.D. Mo. 1975), affld, 520
F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1975). In order to make a showing ofjust cause, however, a witness will need
to make an affirmative showing to the court. See, e.g., United States v. Buckley (In reGrand Jury
Proceedings), 860 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) places burden of
establishingjust cause for refusal to testify on witness); In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir.
1980) (acknowledging that burden to show just cause rests on witness refusing to testify under
court order); In re Bianchi, 542 F.2d 98, 100-01 (1st Cir. 1976) (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1826
requires witness to showjust cause for failure to comply with court order).
131 See, e.g., Slochhower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 554-55 (1996) (fearing
that if he testified, plaintiff would incriminate himself and give cause for defendant to dismiss
him from employment). In addition, while the law allows duress to be used as a defense for
crimes other than murder, the defense is not available if a defendant negligently or recklessly
places himself in a position where he is likely to be subject to duress. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.09(2) (1962); see also Stuart Mass, Note, The Dilemma of the Intimidated Witness in Federal Or-
ganized Crime Prosecutions: Choosing Among the Fear of Reprisals, the Contempt Powers of the Court,
and the Witness Protection Program, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 582, 598 (1982) (indicating that, at
common law, one was able to claim duress as defense if individual had negligently, recklessly or
intentionally put himself in situation in which duress to commit crime was probable).
132. See, e.g., In reGrandJury Proceedings, 877 F.2d 849, 851 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that
district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to accept witness's fear of retaliation as just
cause for refusing to testify); United States v. Damiano, 579 F.2d 1001, 1004 (6th Cir. 1978)
(stating "fear for the safety of one's self or others is not ground for refusing to testify"); United
States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 388 (7th Cir. 1976) (indicating that"[f]ear, by itself, will not le-
gally justify or excuse witness's refusal to testify"); United States v. Gates, 176 F.2d 78, 80 (2d
Cir. 1949) (declaring that fear of economic reprisal is not sufficient basis for refusal to testify).
133. SeeFED. R. EvID. 804(a).
134. See E. REID, MAFIA 4047 (1952) (discussing omerta).
135. See id.
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ganization, an agency theory subjecting each member of the conspir-
acy to liability for all the other members justifies a finding that the
defendant is at least derivatively responsible for suborning the con-
temptuous act of the witness. As argued below, it is reasonable and
consistent with the evidentiary rules to allow inferences adverse to
the defendant to be derived from the witness's refusal in this context.
The fact that the refusal springs not from a realistic threat of re-
taliation, but rather from the witness's own internalized acceptance
of the code against cooperation, does not significantly alter the logic
of the argument. Fear that the testimony may diminish the esteem in
which a witness is held in his or her community, or may affect the
witness's status, is not a legally cognizable basis to withhold testi-
mony.'6 If the witness and defendant both mutually participate in a
shared "culture of conspiracy" that valorizes criminal behavior and
demonizes cooperation with legal authorities, the defendant should
share responsibility for the creation and maintenance of the ethic
against cooperation. While punishing a defendant for participation
in a particular culture goes against the grain of a criminal justice sys-
tem constructed to punish individual culpability, it does not elimi-
nate altogether the doctrine of individual autonomy.3 7 In a multicul-
tural society such as urban America,"s the choice to join and
strengthen the culture of conspiracy reflects the autonomous deci-
sion of the organization's participants.
Third, a witness may refuse to testify out of fear that he or she may
at a later date be prosecuted for perjury. Although the witness has
no immediate fear of self-incrimination, he or she could be subjected
to criminal prosecution for lying on the stand.' 39 The witness might
136. See In re Williams, 152 S.E.2d 317, 324 (N.C. 1967) (affirming contempt citation of
minister refusing to testify in rape prosecution on grounds that such testimony would ruin his
reputation in community).
137. See Richard S. Murphy, Comment, The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth v. Maryland
and the Philosophy of Punishment in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1303, 1308 (1988)
(discussing basis of retribution theory of criminal punishment is holding individual account-
able for his actions).
138. For a discussion of racial and ethnic diversity in American Cities, see generallyJ. Har-
vie Wilkinson III, The Law of Civil Rights and the Dangers of Separatism in Multicultural America, 47
STAN. L. REv. 993 (1995).
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1) (1994). 18 U.S.C. § 1621 states, in pertinent part:
Whoever-(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in
any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered,
that he will testify... truly... willfully and contrary to such oath states... any mate-
rial matter which he does not believe to be true ... is guilty of perjury and shall.., be
fined... or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Winter, 70 F.3d 655, 659 (1st Cir. 1995) (dismissing defendant's
argument that because government "always knew he would refuse to testify, they sought his
immunity for the vindictive purpose of 'setting him up' to commit perjury"); United States v.
De Salvo, 20 F.3d 1216, 1222 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing necessity of immunity grant where de-
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therefore argue that the Fifth Amendment privilege should prevent
him or her from providing the grounds for incrimination. Although
this argument is made frequently in criminal contempt proceedings,
it obviously does not withstand scrutiny.
First, no witness has a right to invent testimony with impunity.
Second, because the witness has been immunized, truthful testimony
cannot provide any basis for incrimination, 4' and the witness cannot
be prosecuted for prior perjured testimony based on contradictory
testimony later given under oath.42 Any remaining incentive to lie
must spring, therefore, not from the witness's own fear of self-
incrimination, but from reluctance to implicate a coconspirator. If
that reluctance fuels the defendant's desire to avoid testifying, the
adverse inference is again justified.
Finally, the witness simply may have a powerful desire not to in-
criminate the defendant. It is, of course, this last reason that pro-
vides the strongest basis both for allowing the witness's refusal to tes-
tify to occur before the jury, and for an adverse inference to be
drawn against the defendant. If the witness has no real fear of self-
incrimination, the willingness to suffer what appears to be the com-
paratively minor penalty of criminal contempt in hopes of preventing
a coconspirator from receiving a long criminal sentence is rational as
an organizational or conspiratorial strategy.4 4 The tactic of making
the witness refuse to testify in front of the jury should be permitted in
order to undermine this strategy.
In short, although the ambiguous evidentiary value of a witness's
rightful invocation of the privilege makes that evidence less probative
of the defendant's culpability, the problem of ambiguity is substan-
tially reduced when the witness no longer possesses the right to ref-
use to testify. 44 While giving testimony that implicates the witness in
fendant has legitimate fear of perjury prosecution, but noting that grant of immunity in such
cases removes basis for refusing to testify).
140. SeeNix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 169 (1986) (rejecting constitutional right to commit
perjury in one's defense).
141. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (protecting witnesses from criminal prosecution based on state-
ment given under immunity).
142. See id. (detailing available uses of immunized testimony in perjury prosecutions). Sec-
tion 6002 has been interpreted to mean that accurate testimony given under a grant of immu-
nity cannot be used for perjury prosecutions for prior false statements, but may be used in per-
jury prosecutions for false statements made while under immunity. See In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 625 F.2d 767, 770 n.2 (8th Cir. 1980).
143. Criminal contempt is punishable by fine, imprisonment or both. See 42 U.S.C. § 1995
(1994). The fine may not exceed one thousand dollars and the prison term may not exceed six
months. See id. Compare this with the term of imprisonment for felonies, which range from
one to five years for minor crimes to life imprisonment or the death pealty for serious offenses.
See id.
144. See 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1994) (allowing imprisonment of individual who refuses to
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criminal activity may be embarrassing to the witness, the refusal to
testify in the face of a court order is unlikely to be motivated by mere
embarrassment. The removal of this fundamental ambiguity dra-
matically transforms the underlying context and restructures the
logical inferences that naturally flow from the act of non-
cooperation.
Some courts, in sorting out the circumstances under which the
forced invocation of the privilege can be sanctioned, have distin-
guished between the "ordinary witness" and those witnesses who are
"so closely connected with the defendant by the facts of the case, the
pleadings, or relationship, that the inferences of the witness's guilt
would likely be imputed to the defendant."'45 While forcing witnesses
who fall into the latter category to invoke their privilege before the
jury might unavoidably prejudice the defendant, "it may well be
proper in some cases to have the proceeding in the presence of the
jury where the government is dealing with" witnesses of the more or-
dinary variety.' This approach seems logical when the witness in-
vokes a Fifth Amendment privilege, because the very certainty that
accompanies the invocation is likely to taint the defendant. 47 If the
witness has no right to invoke a privilege, the logic is reversed. When
a defendant has no justifiable fear of self-incrimination, the close re-
lationship with the defendant creates a powerful inference that the
witness is refusing to testify in order to protect the defendant. An ad-
verse inference therefore becomes much more appropriate. In con-
trast, "ordinary witnesses" who lack such a relationship with the de-
fendant, yet refuse to testify, are much more likely to have other
reasons for refusing to cooperate aside from protecting the defen-
dant.
Indeed, this logic has long been accepted when a witness who can-
not claim a legitimate privilege refuses to testify. Subject to certain
important limitations, such inferences have commonly been allowed
in civil trials, and occasionally in criminal trials, under what is known
as the "missing witness doctrine."'48
comply with court order to testify);sem also In re GrandJury Investigation, 600 F.2d 420, 428 (3d
Cir. 1979) (upholding district court's civil contempt imprisonment under § 1826(a) of immu-
nized witness).
145. Sev United States v. Ritz, 548 F.2d 510, 518 (5th Cir. 1977) (quoting San Fratello v.
United States, 340 F.2d 560, 565 (5th Cir. 1965)).
146. See id. at 520.
147. See supra Part IIIAL (exploring ambiguities created by invocation of Fifth Amendment
rights).
148. See Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118 (1893) (establishing "missing witness doc-
trine").
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B. The Missing Witness Doctrine
It is a standard component of the law of evidence that adverse in-
ferences 9 may be drawn against a party based on its omissions.'
Similarly, when a party destroys evidence, an adverse inference may
be drawn against it."5' An unfavorable inference may be drawn
against a party not only for destroying evidence, but for the mere
failure to produce witnesses or documents within its control.5 ' The
classic articulation of the missing witness doctrine appears in Graves
v. United States,13 where the Supreme Court held that, "if a party has it
peculiarly within his power to produce witnesses whose testimony
would elucidate the transaction, the fact that he does not do it cre-
ates the presumption that the testimony, if produced, would be unfa-
vorable."'" Such an inference does not require the jury to speculate
as to the substance of the witness's unheard testimony, but rather
only to infer that the witness's testimony would have been adverse to
the defendant. 5
149. See In re Braycovich, 314 P.2d 767, 771 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (noting that an infer-
ence is a reasonable deduction made by the fact-finder drawn from proven facts, and an ad-
verse inference is one that disadvantages one of the parties).
150. See 2JOHN HENRYWIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 285-288 Uames H. Chadbour rev., 1979).
151. See CLEARYET AL., supra note 90, § 74.1, at 177.
152. See id. § 272, at 804-05.
153. 150 U.S. 118 (1893).
154. See id. at 121; see also United States v. Busic, 587 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1978) (following
Graves ruling that allows jury to draw adverse inference against party failing to call available wit-
ness), rev'd n other grounds, 446 U.S. 398 (1980). But see Burgess v. United States, 440 F.2d 226,
233 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (interpreting Graves as allowing exceptions to the presumption). The
court in Burgess stated, "Not every absent but producible witness who can be held to have some
knowledge of the facts need by reason of Graves be made the subject of the 'presumption.'" Id.
at 233. Since Graves, courts have interpreted the missing witness doctrine to permit a permissi-
ble inference rather than a presumption. See Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 13,
52 (1927) (stating that presumption "is to be cautiously applied"); see also In re Williams, 190
728, 732-33 (1996) (explaining that Federal Circuit only permits "adverse inferences" when a
witness is missing in three circumstances); Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Anchor Media Tele., Inc., 831 F.
Supp. 16, 31 (D.R.I. 1993), afJ'd, 45 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that there is no basis for
adverse influence if missing witness is equally available to both parties and not "favorable dis-
posed" to the nonproducing party).
155. See Felice v. Long Island R.R. Co., 426 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1970) (determining that
jury should not decide verdict by speculating as to content of lost, missing witness testimony).
In many instances, this may amount to the same thing. If the witness's testimony is relevant
only because he or she allegedly could answer a simple question such as whether the defendant
was at the scene of the crime, a refusal to answer, interpreted adversely to the defendant, could
only translate into an affirmative one. testify in a manner adverse to the defendant must assume
that he or she would have answered in the affirmative. Two states, Minnesota and Rhode Is-
land, expressly disallow missing witness instructions in criminal trials. See Stier, supra note 45, at
163; see also United States v. Tucker, 552 F.2d 202, 210 (7th Cir. 1977) (explaining development
of missing witness rule as permissive inference rather than presumption). This reluctance
springs perhaps from a recognition that more complicated scenarios might make an adverse
inference rule based on a refusal to answer more difficult to implement. For instance, where a
defendant is alleged to have committed some specific act in furtherance of a conspiracy, and a
potential witness is alleged to have assumed a planning role in the conspiracy but refuses to
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Applicability of the missing witness doctrine hinges on the active
failure of a party to produce a material witness." Not only must such
a witness be material, the witness must be uniquely under the control
of the party against whom the adverse inference is sought.17 The re-
quirement that the witness be "under the party's control" is critical to
any attempt to transpose the missing witness rule to cases of cocon-
spirator witness non-cooperation. 8 Though such a witness may be
material, the government must demonstrate that the coconspirator is
at least constructively under the defendant's control. 9 In addition,
the missing witness doctrine only applies when the testimony of a
witness is expected to be favorable to the defendant, given the de-
fendant's account of the facts or the context of the situation. 'O The
defendant's failure to produce the witness, considering his or her
power to produce the witness as well as the apparent incentive to do
so, together create the grounds to infer that the reason the defen-
dant fails to do so is that the testimony would be unfavorable to
him.161
In a typical criminal trial, when a witness is physically present but
refuses to testify, it will likely be difficult to show that such non-
cooperation can be blamed on the defendant, as the missing witness
doctrine requires. Within the peculiar context of organized crime,
however, it may be possible to satisfy the requirements of the missing
testify, an adverse inference drawn against the defendant could mean: (1) that the defendant
was part of the conspiracy, (2) that the plan called for the defendant to commit a specific act,
or (3) that the witness has knowledge that the defendant actually committed the specific act.
Depending on the particular defense chosen, the selection of the negative inference to draw
from the witness's refusal to testify could have a major impact on the outcome of the trial. Be-
cause it would be speculative and arbitrary to assume, with no additional evidence, that any of
the above inferences is more appropriate than the others, the missing witness doctrine gener-
ally should lead only to the relatively limited inference that the witness's testimony would have
been unfavorable to the defendant, not to the assumption that any specific testimony would
have been given.
156. See United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 651 F.2d 2, 16 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that jury may
draw adverse inference if material witness is not called); see also United States v. Noah, 475 F.2d
688, 691 (9th Cir. 1973) (finding that failure to produce material witness gives rise to presump-
tion of unfavorable testimony).
157. See Noah, 475 F.2d at 691.
158. See Graves, 150 U.S. at 121. For a recent attempt to do this in the civil context, see Li-
butti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1997).
159. SeeWilson v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 893 F.2d 1149, 1151 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding
that party must show that opponent has met criteria before missing witness instruction will be
given).
160. See United States v. St. Michael's Credit Union, 880 F.2d 579, 597 (1st Cir. 1989)
(finding that testimony of witness would have been favorable to defendant because defense
counsel mentioned the witness in his opening arguments).
161. This logic counsels against allowing an adverse inference from the failure of a witness
to testify when that witness's testimony, if provided, would be expected to damage the defense
case. In other words, adverse inferences cannot be argued from the non-cooperation of a per-
son who would, if testifying, be a witness for the prosecution.
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witness doctrine. Where the witness and the defendant both are
members of the same organized crime family, it may be reasonable to
demonstrate that both witness and defendant are subject to each
other's control, or are mutually subject to the control of the organi-
zation. For starters, proof of membership in a criminal "enterprise"
is an element of any prosecution under RICO, the principal statutory
tool for organized crime prosecutions. 62  Thus, witnesses already
convicted of the same or similar charges cannot argue that there
were no such associations.'63 Unlike in the past, when defendants ac-
tively denied even the existence of the mafia, defendants in organ-
ized crime trials now frequently choose to stipulate to, or at least not
to contest, the allegation of association with a criminal enterprise.
Further, there is a well-established basis in the rules of evidence for
making the assumption that members of the same criminal conspir-
acy are subject to each other's control. The coconspirator exception
to the hearsay rule (defined in the Federal Rules of Evidence as an
admission by a party-opponent) holds that "a statement is not hear-
say" and is therefore admissible if made "by a coconspirator of a party
during the course, and in furtherance of, the conspiracy."'6' The ex-
ception is based on a theory of agency which assumes that the shared
interests of the conspirators generally make it reasonable to treat any
statement against interest made by a member of the conspiracy as an
adopted statement of the defendant.' 65 Admittedly, this agency the-
ory is also tempered by the requirement that the statement be made
"during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. "'6 The re-
quirement is intended to limit the use of such statements to situa-
tions in which it is reasonable to assume that the speaker's interests
do not significantly differ from those of the defendant's, 67 and "a
162. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994).
163. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (allowing prior bad act evidence to be used to show common
plan or scheme); see also United States v. Emmanuel, 112 F.3d 977, 980 (8th Cir. 1997)
(permitting evidence of defendant's methamphetamine distribution prior to conspiracy
charged); United States v. Edwards, 69 F.3d 419, 535-36 (10th Cir. 1995) (permitting evidence
of defendant's prior joint efforts to distribute cocaine in manner similar to that giving rise to
current charge), cert. denied, Chaplin v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2497 (1996); United States v.
Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1218 (noting that defendant had stipulated to membership in La
Cosa Nostra, and both parties stipulated that such mere membership was not in itself unlawful).
164. FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (2) (E); see also Patrick J. Sullivan, Note, Bootstrapping of Hearsay
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E): Further Erosion of the Coconspirator Exemption, 74 IOWA
L. REv. 467 (1989) (assessing the rational and judicial development of coconspirator excep-
tion).
165. SeeSullivan, supra note 164, at 475-78.
166. Id. at 478.
167. Alternatively, party admissions have been justified under the theory that their admissi-
bility results from the adversarial system rather than any special guarentees of reliability. See
John S. Strahorn, Jr., A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule, and Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 484,
564 (1937).
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reasonable man in the declarant's position would not have made the
statement unless [he believed] it to be true.'
Within the context of organized crime, the assumption of control
by the defendant over recalcitrant witnesses is often appropriate.
United States v. Remini provides a useful example of why such an as-
sumption is reasonable. George Remini was tried for criminal con-
tempt after having refused to testify in a prior trial against Thomas
Gambino.7  Evidence presented at Remini's trial illustrated that
Gambino boss John Gotti orchestrated Remini's non-cooperationY."
Excerpts from surveillance tapes revealed that Gotti vetoed the sug-
gestion that Thomas Gambino plead guilty to prevent Gotti and
other members of the crime family from having to testifyT7 Gotti in-
dicated that he and Remini stood ready to go to jail instead: "Get my
cell ready; getJoe Butch's cell ready, and get Fat Georgie's cell ready.
And nobody is taking the stand. Tell them to go fight! Don't worry
about it."*' As this excerpt suggests, the structure of organized crime
may justify, at least in some circumstances, applying an agency theory
in cases of witness non-cooperation. This theory, furthermore,
need not be based solely on a constructive theory of corporate
agency.
Sometimes, as in Remini, members of the criminal organization
counsel each other in the art of testifying falsely.75  In other in-
stances, house counsel for the organizations may provide the actual
lines of communication among defendants. Often, a single lawyer
will simultaneously represent a large number of criminal defendants
from the same crime family, 76 requiring courts to conduct lengthy
168. See FED. R EVID. 804(b) (3).
169. 967 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1992).
170. See id. at 755.
171. See id. at 756.
172. See id.
173. United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 552,557 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
174. Se FBI, supra note 127, at 14 (discussing hierarchical structure of Mafia).
175. The contents of one surveillance recording, known as the "Trailer Tape," capture
Sammy Gravano tutoring another member of the Gambino family on appropriate evasive
measures to take before a grand jury:
You're called to the grandjury. You gotta take the fifth. Alright so far? Now they
give you immunity. What do you do?... Now I told him there is three things: com-
mon sense, common sense is one part, seventy-five percent of the answers. Another
ten or fifteen percent ... (inaudible) you gotta dance and bob and weave. One, I
didn't remember, I don't think so, or to the best of my knowledge. Okay? Let's say
fifteen percent, so that's seventy-five percent, so we're up to ninety percent. Ten per-
cent, you out and out lie.
United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 364 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1671 (1996).
176. See, e.g., United States v. Locasio, 6 F.3d 924, 931 (2d Cir.) (disqualifying attorney
Bruce Cutler from representing Gotti because "Cutler had acted as 'house counsel' to the
Gambino Crime Family by receiving 'benefactor payments' to represent others in the criminal
enterprise").
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proceedings in which defendants waive their right to contest the at-
torney's conflict of interest.77 One reason a defendant may not care
if his lawyer is simultaneously involved in the defense of other mem-
bers of the same crime organization might be that the decisions
about trial strategy in his trial are being made by others in the or-
ganization. By coordinating defenses across an organization, a lawyer
helps to enforce a general defense strategy that increases the ability
of the organization to survive at the occasional expense of some indi-
viduals within it. Certainly, a perusal of the cases reveals many in-
stances in which lawyers have served this type of function.' 78 The co-
ordination of obstruction of justice by lawyers or other members of
the organization thus transfers the effective control of material wit-
nesses from the individual to the criminal enterprise, each member
of which, under the law of conspiracy, is responsible for the actions
of the others made in furtherance of the conspiracy.'"
Moving away from the unique dynamics of organized crime and
into the broader field of multi-defendant trials, the agency assump-
tion between codefendants or between a defendant and a thirty party
witness grows significantly weaker. Presumably, an adverse inference
based specifically on the missing witness doctrine would first require
a sufficient showing at trial that the defendant exerted control over
the witness, or that a criminal organization exercised control over
both. This showing would consist of evidence indicating a special re-
lationship between witness and defendant that might be termed
"conspiratorial responsibility." Such a showing is necessary because
the government seeks to argue a speculative inference rather than
merely introduce out-of-court statements that, whatever their indicia
of reliability, at least have the virtue of concreteness. In order for
such speculative evidence to be deemed comparably reliable, this re-
quired showing of conspiratorial responsibility would have to exceed
177. These proceedings are known as "Curcio Waivers." See United States v. Curcio, 680
F.2d 881, 888-90 (2d Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 986 (1st Cir.
1987) (upholding conviction of attorney who pressured client to defy court order to testify).
But see United States v. Stantini, 85 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir.) (rejecting petition for conflict of interest
where defendant's lawyer was simultaneously involved in defense of another member of Gam-
bino Crime Family), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 498 (1996).
178. In United States v. Cintolo, for example, the court upheld the conviction of a lawyer who
advised his client to persist in refusing to testify despite having been immunized and put under
court order. See United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 983 (lst Cir. 1987). In reference to the
lawyer's role in encouraging his client to obstruct justice, the court noted, "[t]he recurring
theme of each conversation, significantly, was that [the witness] be coerced into 'standing
up-to serve an eighteen month sentence for contempt-rather than to accept immunity
gracefully and testify freely before the grand jury." Id. at 986.
179. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAw §§ 6.4-6.5 (2d ed. 1986)
(discussing origin and theory of conspiracy law including ramifications of conspirator status).
138
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by a substantial margin the showing that the government must make
to gain the admission of hearsay evidence under the coconspirator
exception to the hearsay rule. 80 In contrast, in organized crime,
where 'made members' of the organization ritually take a vow of si-
lence as part of their initiation into the criminal organization, the
prerequisite relationship of conspiratorial responsibility is readily
IN[
seen.
In the absence of an explicit showing of a conspiratorial relation-
ship between witness and defendant, the inferences allowable against
a defendant must be highly circumscribed. It is better to interpret
the missing witness rule in such circumstances to work in tandem
with other proof of the facts, and to provide a presumption in favor
of an adverse interpretation of those facts, rather than as an inde-
pendent basis for a specific adverse inference. When the witness is
unable to claim any personal privilege, however, and the prosecutor
can demonstrate a conspiratorial relationship between the defendant
and the witness, a prosecutor's attempt to elicit testimony from the
witness is reasonable and fair. 2
IV. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES
In addition to prosecutorial misconduct, reversible error arises, ac-
cording to the Supreme Court in Namet, when "inferences from a
witness's refusal to answer added critical weight to the prosecution's
case in a form not subject to cross-examination. '"'" In other words,
the tactic of forcing a witness to refuse to testify, regardless of
whether the refusal is grounded in a legitimate Fifth Amendment
privilege claim, must be disallowed if it violates the defendant's Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. 4 Some courts also have
indicated that calling a witness who the state knows will refuse to tes-
tify may violate the defendant's right to cross-examine. 85 Judge
Learned Hand was among those who held this view'86 At least one
180. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (2) (E); see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 173
(1987) (discussing standard for coconspirator exception).
181. See generally REID, supra note 134.
182. See Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 188 (1963) (holding that prosecutor's at-
tempt to elicit testimony was permissible because "[b]oth [witnesses] possessed non-privileged
information... they could, and did, testify that they knew the [defendant] ... and that they
themselves had engaged in [criminal activity]" with defendant).
183. See id. at 187.
184. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
185. See United States v. Deutsch, 987 F.2d 878, 884 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding refusal to
allow defendant to call witness who defendant knows will invoke the privilege, noting that"the
probative value of this evidence is lessened by the inability of the other party to cross-
examine").
186. See United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1959) ("[I]t is clear, not only
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federal district court, however, has ruled specifically that "the mere
calling of a witness to the stand to make him invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination does not constitute a denial of the right to
confrontation.187 The Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause juris-
prudence supports this view.
The Supreme Court has identified four main purposes underlying
the Confrontation Clause.Iss First, by ensuring that testimony is given
under oath, and in the presence of the accused, the Clause seeks to
guarantee that the witness is fully apprised of the seriousness and
moral gravity attending the testimony.89 Second, the Clause ensures
that the jury has an opportunity to assess the demeanor and credibil-
ity of the witness 9' Third, the Clause makes certain that a witness is
subject to cross-examination, which somewhat hyperbolically has
been described as "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth."' 9 In addition, the Supreme Court has stated that
the Confrontation Clause is violated where evidence is introduced
under the unavailable witness provisions of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence if the state fails to make a good faith effort to produce the wit-
192
ness.
None of these interests is abrogated when the prosecution calls a
non-privileged witness who it knows will refuse to testify. The good-
faith production requirement, for instance, is amply satisfied by the
prophylactic steps taken to present the witness, which include grant-
ing immunity and subpoenaing or physically producing the witness in
court. When such steps are taken it is difficult to dispute the claim
that the presumed answer has not the sanction of an oath, but-what is even more important-
that the accused cannot cross examine.").
187. Cota v. Arizona, 304 F. Supp. 876, 879 (D. Ariz. 1969).
188. See Tom Patton, Comment, Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause-Is a Showing of Un-
availability Required?, 17 S. ILL. U.L.J. 573, 574-90 (1993) (discussing development of Confronta-
tion Clause case law).
189. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
63 n.6 (1980).
190. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895). The Court in Mattox stated:
The primary object of the... [Confrontation Clause] was.., not only of testing the
recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand
face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his de-
meanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is
worthy of belief.
Id. at 242-43.
191. See Green, 399 U.S. at 158; see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 ("[A] primary interest secured
by [the Confrontation Clause] is the right of cross-examination." (quoting Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965))).
192. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968) ("[A] witness is not 'unavailable' for
purposes of the foregoing exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial
authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.").
PRISONER'S DILEMMA
that the government has made the necessary good-faith effort to se-
cure the availability of the witness.
In allowing the witness's refusal to testify to take place in front of
the jury, the first two concerns underlying the Confrontation Clause
are satisfied easily. First, the civil and penal sanctions available to a
judge to enforce court orders, as well as the potential criminal
charges that may be brought once the trial is over, adequately com-
municate to the witness the "seriousness and moral gravity" attending
the proceeding.9 Second, by bringing the witness before the jury,
the state acts consistently with the deeper concern embodied in the
Confrontation Clause, namely, that the jury be able to weigh the
credibility of all the participants involved in the trial.' Even when a
witness is not providing substantive testimony, the State nonetheless
has an interest in compelling the witness to confront the jury, face to
face, so that the jury may decide from his or her demeanor what sig-
nificance to accord the event.9
The resulting inability to cross-examine the witness, though, is
somewhat more troublesome. '9 The Confrontation Clause is in-
tended "to advance 'the accuracy of the truth-determining process in
criminal trials,"" 97 but it must represent more than a simple constitu-
tionalization of the rules of evidence: "Correctly interpreted, the
[C]onfrontation [C]lause is not a minor adjunct of evidence law, but
is one of a bundle of rights that assures the accused the protection of
our adversary system. It assures the accused the adversarial testing of
the prosecution's evidence. ' "
The critical question, then, is whether the adversarial testing func-
tion is short-circuited when a witness refuses to answer questions
posed by either the state or the defense. Because Confrontation
193. Green, 399 U.S. at 158.
194. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
195. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242.
196. The issue was expressly raised in United States v. Jackson, Nos. 94-5338 and 94-5440,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 13554 (4th Cir. June 2, 1995) (unpublished decision), in which the
court found no error in the unsuccessful cross-examination of a contemptuous witness. See id.
at *8 (holding no error where defendant refused to testify and prior grand jury testimony was
consequently admitted).
197. Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35
UCLA L. RE%,. 557, 576 (1988).
198. See id. at 622; see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992) (maintaining that,
"where proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted
exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied"); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S.
805, 814 (1990) (reminding interpreters "not to equate the Confrontation Clause's prohibi-
tions with the general rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay statements"); Margeret A.
Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Re-
straint Model, 76 MINN. L. REv. 557, 557-58 (1992) (discussing relegation of Confrontation
Clause to mere equation with law of evidence).
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Clause interpretation has centered on the right of cross-
examination,'99 a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights presuma-
bly would be violated only where the witness's absolute refusal to an-
swer questions in open court actually constitutes "unrebutted testi-
mony" by a "witness against him. ''2tm In other words, for the
Confrontation Clause to apply, a defendant must have a witness to
confront and some substantive adverse testimony that cross-
examination would allow the defendant to test.
20 1
A. The "Witnesses Against Him" Clause
Perhaps the Supreme Court's most interesting treatment of the
Confrontation Clause's requirement that a defendant have an oppor-
tunity to confront "witnesses against him 202 can be found in White v.
Illinois. 0 In White, the defendant was accused of sexually molesting a
four-year-old girl.204 Although the girl did not testify, the trial court
allowed others, including the doctor and nurse that had examined
her, to testify to the girl's explanatory statements after the assault. 20
The trial court found that such statements were admissible under
various exceptions to the hearsay rule. 206 The Court agreed that al-
lowing the statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas explained that the phrase
"witnesses against him" should be interpreted to mean that a criminal
defendant's right to confront witnesses be limited to "any witness who
actually testifies at trial" or to witnesses whose testimony is delivered
through "formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, deposi-
tions, prior testimony, or confessions. 20 7 Such a view is consistent
with the original intentions of the Framers, who were particularly at-
tuned to the abuses of process committed by the British in the Six-
teenth Century, such as presenting proof at trial that often was "given
by reading depositions, confessions of accomplices, letters, and the
199. See, e.g., Andrew Taslitz, Catharsis, The Confrontation Clause, and Expert Testimony, 22
CAP. U. L. REv. 103, 139 (1993) ("The critical importance of an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, is definitely, consistent with a long line of United States Supreme Court Confron-
tation Clause jurisprudence.").
200. Douglass v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1965).
201. See id. (holding that petitioner's inability to cross-examine witness regarding alleged
confession was violation of confrontation clause).
202. SeeU.S. CONST. amend. VI.
203. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
204. See id.
205. See id. at 350.
206. See id. at 346 (clarifying admissibility "under state law hearsay exceptions for spontane-
ous declaration and for stateents made in the course of securing medical treatment.").
207. Id. at 364-66.
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like. ' ' ° In order to protect the accused from such practices, the Con-
frontation Clause assures the defendant the opportunity to have "'the
witnesses brought before him face to face.'
2 09
Applying this reading of the phrase "witnesses against him," it is
clear that a witness's in-court refusal to testify would not violate the
Confrontation Clause. When a witness is called into court and pro-
vided an opportunity to testify, the main function of the guarantee is
satisfied, even if the witness refuses, because the defendant has an
opportunity to confront the non-cooperative witness "face to face."
To the contrary, when the witness's non-cooperation is clearly harm-
ful to the defendant, and there is no possibility of self-incrimination,
a trial judge's decision to exclude the refusal would seem to violate the
spirit of the Clause. The ruling would prevent the witness from fac-
ing the defendant in court and would keep the defendant from exert-
ing the moral suasion that would attach to such a confrontation. In
sum, a witness who refuses to testify at trial does not produce testi-
mony that requires rebuttal, since such a witness obviously is not one
who "actually testifies at trial.
210
The same point can be made by examining, not the intent of the
witness (in this case, the intent is to provide no testimony at all), but
208. Id. at 361 (quoting 1 J. STEPHAN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 221,
326 (1883)).
209. Id.
210. See id. at 352-57. The majority in White however, explicitly rejected the interpretation
of Justices Thomas and Scalia. Under the majority view, it was much less certain that a non-
cooperating witness should not be considered a "witness against" for the purposes of the Con-
frontation Clause. Ste id. Nonetheless, even the broad criteria established by the Court in its
landmark Confrontation Clause decision of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See United
States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) (interpreting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)), and
later restricted in White, see White, 502 U.S. at 354-57 (restricting Ohio ruling to facts of that case
where out-of-court statement in question is in context of prior testimony), indicate that the
presentation of a non-testifying witness does not violate the Confrontation Clause. While the
Court's decision in Roberts places a heavy production burden on the state before a witness will
be found unavailable, see Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-75 (discussing criteria that must be met by
prosecution before witness is declared unavailable), this production burden is clearly met in
the case of the produced, immunized and uncooperative witness. Even under the broadest
reading of Roberts, such a witness presents no Confrontation Clause violation. Moreover, the
Court in White refused to go even so far as to require actual production. See White, 502 U.S. at
357 ("Establishing a generally applicable unavailability rule would have few practical benefits
while imposing pointless litigation costs."). Instead, the adopted rule required courts only to
engage in the unavailability analysis, rather than actually find the witness unavailable. See id. at
356-57. This holding comports with the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence that favors a balanc-
ing approach to such issues, over rigid rules. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243
(1895) (noting that "general rules of law.., however beneficent in thier operation and valu-
able to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the ne-
cessities of the case"). Although the majority in White v. Illinois rejected the position ofJustices
Thomas and Scalia, it nonetheless came to the same conclusion in the case, that the out-of-
court statements made by a sexually-abused girl were not inadmissible hearsay, and the admis-
sion of the statements, despite the potential availability of the witness, did not violate the Con-
frontation Clause. See White, 502 U.S. at 356-57.
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rather the evidence produced by the procedure. First, the mere fact
that an individual provides a source of evidence does not make that
evidence "testimonial. 21' A long line of Supreme Court cases hasS • 212
limited the kind of evidence that qualifies for this designation. For
instance, the Court has explicitly stated that participating in a line-up
for identification purposes,215 the provision of handwriting exem-
plars,214 the provision of blood,215 and the modeling of clothing"1 6 are
"non-testimonial." Other courts have held that providing DNA,21 7
hair,18 bodily fluids,219 and other types of forensic evidencem are
"non-testimonial." In order to be testimonial, the Supreme Court
has explained that a "communication must itself, explicitly or implic-
itly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information."22' 1 Since the
physical presence of a silent witness does not meet this requirement,
the mere appearance in court by a non-cooperative witness does not
by itself create testimony. Instead, he or she performs a "verbal act"
by invoking the privilege, or by facing contempt sanctions after refus-
ing to testify. m
B. The Verbal Act Doctrine
The verbal act doctrine is an evidence precept that has received
211. Seegenerally6WIGMORE, supra note 150, § 1766.
212. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 592 (1990) (holding that slurred nature
of defendant's answers to police questions was non-testimonial evidence); Doe v. United States,
487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988) (defining 'testimonial' as communications that"explicitly or implic-
itly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information"); United States v. Dionisio, 388 U.S. 1, 7
(1970) (stating that voice recordings used to measure physical properties of witness's voices
were non-testimonial evidence).
213. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967) (holding that participation in
lineup for identification purposes does not result in testimonial evidence).
214 See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (stating that handwriting exem-
plars are "physical characteristics" and are non-testimonial unlike content of writing).
215 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (concluding that withdrawal of
defendant's blood would not provide testimonial evidence).
216 See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 251-53 (1910) (stating that, when defendant
models clothing for witness to view, he did not provide evidence of a testimonial nature). For
an indelible example of how such prosecutorial techniques can backfire, see commentaries on
the O.J. Simpson murder trial. See Henry Reske, Observers Say Prosecution Lost the Case Over a
Bloody Glove, Racist Cop, 81 A.BAJ., Nov. 1995, at 48.
217. See Prince v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. App. 4th 1176, 1179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (stating
that non-testimonial evidence is involved when defendant provides semen for DNA testing).
218. See Fouts v. Georgia, 239 S.E. 2d 366, 370 (Ga. 1977) (holding that hair samples are
nontestimonial evidence).
219. See Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347, 1350 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that urine samples
taken for drug testing do not constitute testimonial evidence).
220. See Connecticut v. Chesney, 353 A.2d 783, 788 (Conn. 1974) (stating that application
of parafin wax to hands to test for gunpowder residue is not testimonial evidence).
221. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
222. See generally 6 WIGMORE, supra note 150, § 1772 (providing descriptions of situations in
which utterances are "verbal acts" rather than testimonial evidence).
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scant attention from the Supreme Court. Verbal acts are
"utterances which accompany some act or conduct to which it is de-
sired to give a legal effect."224 They are exempt from the hearsay rule
because they are "not an assertion" and are "not offered to prove the
facts asserted."2 Because verbal acts do not constitute hearsay, their
admission does not raise Confrontation Clause problems under the
theory that there can be no real dispute regarding the truth of the
facts contained within the statement.226 Examples of verbal acts in-
clude saying "I do" at a wedding, offering or accepting a contract,227
using "threatening words,"
=ss and placing bets. 22
Invoking the Fifth Amendment right, or refusing to testify in court,
is a perfect example of a verbal act. The statement triggers a compli-
cated set of legal consequences the significance of which can be de-
bated, like other evidence, by counsel at trial.23' As one commentator
explained, the invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege "is not a
testimonial or communicative act .... It is simply a physical reality of
the trial, akin to the fact, likewise obvious to the jury, that [the de-
fendant] fits a certain physical description or behaves in a manner
indicative of guilt."23'
Another feature of a verbal act is that though it technically involves
speech, its nature makes it virtually nonsensical to attempt to deter-
223. The verbal act doctrine applies in those situations where "declarations of an individual
are so connected with his acts... [that] the declaration becomes part of the transaction and is
admissible." 31A CJ.S. Evidence § 403(2) (West 1964 and Supp. 1996). The language of the
doctrine stems from Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 75 U.S. 397, 411 (1869). Despite the Supreme
Court's limited discussion in Mosey, some states have discussed the verbal act doctrine. See, e.g.,
Gurganus v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 100 S.E.2d 81, 84 (N.C. 1957) (holding verbal act doc-
trine inapplicable because the "declarations did not accompany conduct to which it was desired
to give legal effect").
224. See 31A CJ.S. Evidence§ 403(2) (West 1964) ("In some cases, the term 'verbal act' has
been used to describe a declaration admissible as circumstantially relevant to establish a fact,
but without testimonial effect in itself.").
225. See CLEARYET AL., supra note 90, § 249, at732.
226. See 6 WIGMORE, supra note 150, § 1772 (stating that because verbal acts are not asser-
tions, they are not offered as evidence of truth of any matter).
227. See CLEARY ET AL., supra note 90, § 249, at 733 ("[0] ral utterances... constituting the
offer and acceptance [of a contract] ... are not evidence of assertions offered testimonially but
rather of utterances.. .).
228. SeeUnited States v.Jones, 663 F.2d 567,571 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that statements of
defendant's threats against federal officers are not offered to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted, but rather constitute "operative words of criminal action").
229. Ser State v. Romano, 332 A.2d 64 (Conn. 1973) (concluding that evidence of tele-
phone calls placing bets were not offered to prove that content of calls were true, but were ver-
bal acts constituting evidence of betting activity).
230. See Albert v. Aschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain
Silent, 94 MICH. L. R v. 2625, 2672 n.177 (1996) (proposing statute in which defendant's deci-
sion to remain silent is explicitly made subject to comment by prosecution).
231. Seeid.at868.
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mine "the truth or falsity of the [speech]." 2 To take one example,
the words "I do" signify legal acceptance of the marriage contract.
Beyond that, any investigation into their meaning is pointless. Cross-
examination of the speaker regarding the substance of the statement
would be unlikely to provide any new interpretation or reading of the
phrase. Contrast this with out of court hearsay statements offered for
their truth, such as 'John told me that Wendy murdered Bill." Al-
though the rules of evidence might allow the statement to be admit-
ted to prove the fact thatJohn and the listener spoke, it would not be
admissible as evidence that Wendy was the murderer.23 A higher
standard, or greater "indicia of reliability," is required before a court
can find such easily falsified evidence admissible.24
Refusing to testify is like saying "I do" at a wedding-its signifi-
cance is self-evident. The witness refuses to answer any questions or
provide any substantive testimony regarding the proceeding. Gross-
examination of this witness is pointless, since there is no "testimony"
to cross-examine. It is as if the government had admitted a photo or
a bloody glove. Although the significance of the evidence is subject
to different interpretations that might necessitate the introduction of
additional rebuttal evidence, the photo or the glove itself cannot be
interrogated or cross-examined, only interpreted. So too the verbal
act. Therefore the refusal of a witness to testify before ajury does not
violate the Confrontation Clause.25
V. HANDLING THE EVIDENCE
A. Prejudice
Prejudice occurs where there is "an undue tendency to suggest de-
cision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one." 6 The associative inference of guilt attached to forc-
ing a witness to invoke the privilege before the jury might provide
grounds for exclusion under Rule 403. Yet, if the witness has no
privilege, due to prior conviction or plea, or the privilege has been
232. See Gurganus v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 100 S.E.2d 81, 84 (N.C. 1957).
233. SeeFED. R. EVID. 802.
234. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (suggesting that there must be some
"indicia of reliability" to determine whether statement may be placed before jury, despite lack
of confrontation of declarant).
235. See Bartel, supra note 13, at 1417 (arguing that accomplice witness who invokes privi-
lege should do so before jury, as "the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause may be implicated where ajury is not permitted to learn that a prosecution witness had
claimed the attorney-client privilege in response to specific questions").
236. SeeFED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
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obviated because of the conferral of use immunity, the negative in-
ference flowing from the refusal to testify no longer has the same as-
sociative quality. 1 7 Compared to situations where the witness has a
legitimate fear of self-incrimination, the motivation of the non-
privileged witness is much more likely to be related directly to the
circumstances confronting the defendant, and thus the adverse in-
ference is in some sense brought about by the defendant.
In an adversarial system, the determination of what kinds of evi-
dence are too prejudicial to be admissible hinges on the
"rebuttability" of the evidence.2 38 Seen in this light, prejudicial evi-
dence is evidence that, because of its peculiar nature, prevents the
defendant from challenging its credibility.sss Accordingly, the deter-
mination of whether the inferences stemming from a witness's refusal
to testify are rebuttable should also encompass whether they are
prejudicial under Rule 403. As previously discussed, the non-
testimonial nature of the act removes any concern with a Confronta-
tion Clause violation.240 That also, however, means that there is no
basis on which to cross-examine.
Whether a substantive point actually requires rebutting depends
on the nature of the evidence, or the content of the inference drawn
from the refusal to testify.24' If the government presents non-
cooperative witnesses to show that important members of the crimi-
nal organization refuse to testify without cooperation agreements,
the defense theoretically could attempt to rebut that claim by calling
other members of the criminal enterprise. Although they would be
unlikely to pursue this strategy in reality, that does not mean that the
defendant lacked an opportunity to rebut the inference. It indicates,
instead, that the inference argued by the prosecutor is likely to be
true.
Some evidence, although potentially highly prejudicial, remains
admissible under a theory of party admissions.242 When the defen-
237. See id.
238. See Gold, supra note 101, at 508 (arguing that"[w]hen the tendency of evidence to in-
duce inferential error cannot be overcome by opposing counsel, that evidence is unfairly
prejudicial").
239. See id. (pointing out that prejudicial evidence provides insufficient opportunity for re-
buttal by opposing counsel). As Gold explains, "finding unfair prejudice under Rule 403 in the
tendency to lead to inferential error advances the cause of fairness by identifying Rule 403 as a
remedy for an inadequate opportunity to rebut." Id. at 509.
240. See supra notes 184-222 and accompanying text (exploring Confrontation Clause im-
plications).
241. For a discussion of various inferences drawn from the refusal to testify, see Diane Luka-
Hopson, Note, The Existing Conflict Between the Defendant's Right of Confrontation and the Witness'
Right to Avoid Self-incrimination: A Constitutional Dilnmma, 38 CATH. L. REv. 245 (1988).
242. See generally CLEARY ET AL., supra note 90, § 262 (defining party admissions as words or
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dant takes actions constituting an obstruction of justice, for instance,
"the evidence is generally admitted, despite incidental disclosure of
another crime.'2 43 The prohibition against other crimes evidence,
which is exceedingly prejudicial, is considered to be waived by the at-
tempt to obstruct or impede the judicial process."'
Thus, a Rule 403 inquiry into prejudice will inevitably require a
case-specific analysis of the factors at play.2 5 The analysis will turn on
the purposes for which the government seeks to elicit the act of non-
cooperation, and how the other evidence produced at trial serves
these purposes. The court will have to consider whether the infer-
ences that the government attempts to draw are theoretically rebut-
table. If not, those inferences are probably in violation of Rule 403
and should be excluded. Finally, the handling of the evidence, if it is
allowed into the trial, must be carefully controlled through the craft-
ing of effective jury instructions.
B. Jury Instructions
Clearly, the court must devise instructions that communicate to the
jury the precise purposes for allowing an act of non-cooperation to
become an evidentiary fact at trial.246 The judge must instruct the
jury not to draw any unduly speculative inferences based on the act of
241non-cooperation. In most cases, the jury should be prohibited
from drawing any adverse inference about the content of a non-
cooperative witness's testimony.248 When the government has ade-
quately shown a "conspiratorial relationship," these prohibitions on
the drawing of adverse inferences may be relaxed in accordance with
acts of a party offered as evidence against him).
243. See id. § 273.
244. See Maguire & Vincent, supra note 47, at 247-49 (arguing that spoliation evidence
should be used primarily for purposes of impeachment, and not as substantive evidence).
245. See supra Part VA (discussing factors that courts should consider when determining
prejudice). For criticism of this case specific balancing approach of Rule 403, see D. Craig
Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge to the Treatment of Prejudical Evidence in Fe-
eral Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L. REV. 289 (1989).
246. See Luka-Hopson, supra note 241, at 255 (discussing use ofjury instructions to preclude
jury from making adverse inferences regarding witness's Fifth Amendment claim). But see Mar-
cotte, The Jury Will Disregard, 73 A.BA. J., Nov. 1987, at 34 (citing study that found that all in-
formation presented at trial affects jury deliberations despite instructions to disregard certain
evidence).
247. See Luka-Hopson, supra note 241, at 255 (discussing use ofjury instructions to address
possible inferences drawn byjury about non-cooperative witness).
248. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 303 (1981) (noting that, although judge cannot
prevent jury from speculating about content of testimony of non-cooperative witness, judge
must use jury instructions to "reduce that speculation to a minimum."); see also Lakeside v.
Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 339 (1978) (stating that judge's instruction that jury should draw no ad-
verse inferences removes adverse speculation from deliberation).
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the missing witness doctrine.4 In no circumstance, however, should
a judge deliver a missing witness instruction which would expressly
250command the jury to draw the adverse inference. Such an instruc-
tion from the court would dramatically change the significance of the
witness's refusal to testify. The evidence of non-cooperation has
been produced, and is equally available to both parties to argue its
meaning. As one commentator has asserted, "a safe and logical test
is: if counsel is free to argue it, the Court is not."5'" Where the gov-
ernment seeks to elicit "more" from the fact of non-cooperation,
such as inferring what the witness would have said had the witness
testified, such argument should be disallowed as overly speculative
and prejudicial to the defendant."2
The appropriate posture to adopt regarding the types of permissi-
ble inferences depends on a context-specific investigation, and the
court's jury instructions must reflect that investigation.2 3 Because
"[plrejudice is largely a product of the circumstances of each case
and the viewpoints of the decisionmakers confronting those circum-
stances, ' 4 jury instructions must carefully reflect the particular evi-
dentiary context in order to delimit the proper evidentiary value of a
witness's refusal to testify.
CONCLUSION: AN ESCAPE FROM THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA
In the classic formulation of the strategic game known as the Pris-
oner's Dilemma, the terms "cooperation" and "defection" refer to
the decisions of accused criminals, held incommunicado, to cooper-
ate or not cooperate with each other" 5 In the world of criminal
prosecution, by contrast, "cooperation" generally refers to a defen-
dant's or witness's willingness to assist the authorities. From the
government's perspective, a successful resolution of the prisoner's di-
lemma is not the mutual resistance of non-cooperating witnesses, but
249. See supra Part II.B (discussing missing witness doctrine).
250. Although case law does not establish whether a judge may give a missing witness in-
struction in the situation described here, an adverse comment by the judge regarding the de-
fendant's silence is clearly impermissible. SeeLakeside, 435 U.S. at 338-41.
251. SeeJulian P. Alexander, Presumptions: Their Use and Abuse, 17 Miss. LJ. 1, 14 (1945).
252. See supra Part III (investigating inferences that may be drawn from non-testifying wit-
ness).
253. See- Craig M. Bradley, Griffin v. California: Still Viable After All These Years, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 1290, 1293 n.18 (1981) (pointing out distinction between factual prescriptions based on
defendant's behavior and irrational presumptions based on exercise of constitutional rights).
254. SeeGold, supra note 101, at 503.
255. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (explaining "prisoners dilemma").
256. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1994) (authorizing goverment to compel witness to testify by
granting immunity to that witness); see also supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing
government cooperation agreements).
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rather the production of all witnesses "whose testimony would eluci-
date the transaction." A successful resolution of the dilemma from
the prisoner's perspective is a failure of the criminal justice system
from the perspective of the prosecutor, and, for that matter, from
that of the judicial system at large. The criminal justice system would
do well, therefore, to reduce the number of opportunities available
to criminal defendants to "win" at the strategic game.
The code of omerta-the ruthlessly enforced retributive mechanism
that the Mafia uses to discourage its members from cooperating with
the authorities-is one tool that organized criminals have used to
"win" the Prisoner's Dilemma. By recalibrating the payoff matrix in
such a way that no organized crime member will think it in his inter-
est to cooperate with the authorities, the enterprise is able to ensure
mutual non-cooperation with the government. The mob has reaped
substantial rewards from this insightful application of game theory. 57
Although game theorists might applaud, the government's appro-
priate response is to make non-cooperation a less viable option for
organized crime. If the government is allowed to utilize the "non-
cooperation" of a witness to the detriment of the defendant, prosecu-
tors can at least partially undermine the effectiveness of omerta. Fur-
thermore, they can do it while preserving the full legal rights of wit-
nesses, and without unfairly jeopardizing a defendant's opportunity
to rebut the adverse inferences against him. By pursuing such a
strategy, the Prisoner's Dilemma may become more of a dilemma to
the prisoner, and less of one to the criminal justice system.
257. See generally REID, supra note 134.
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